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APPORTIONMENT OF PROPERTY TAXES
INTRODUCTION

The constitutions of almost half the states allow voters to propose
constitutional amendments or statutes through the initiative process.' In
most states, an initiative is enacted if it receives a simple majority of the
votes cast in an election.2 State legislatures typically have no role in
drafting or approval. A product of the early twentieth-century Progressive movement, the initiative was intended to break the grip special interests had on state legislatures.3 The objective was to promote state
legislation more closely aligned with the views of the general electorate.4
While initiatives are now frequently used to amend state constitutions,
they also create their own legal problems.5
Constitutional challenges and ambiguities in the language of the initiatives place a heavy burden on courts.6 Certainly, the experience in
California supports this criticism. Federal or state courts have struck
down, in whole or in part, four of the ten initiatives enacted by California
voters between 1960 and 1980. 7 A California Supreme Court decision to
1. The states allowing initiatives are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado,
Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, and Washington. L.
TALLIAN, DIRECT DEMOCRACY: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS OF THE INITIATIVE, REFERENDUM AND RECALL PROCESS 45 (1977).
2. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10. Some states require more than a simple majority. Note,

Lousy Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirabilityand Constitutionality of Legislatingby Initiative, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733, 743 n.36 (1988); see also D. BUTLER & A. RANEY, REFERENDUMS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF PRACTICE AND THEORY 69 (1978).
3. See V. KEY & W. CROUCH, THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM IN CALIFORNIA 425,
432 (1939); see also R. HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM 257-68 (1955); G. MCCONNELL,
PRIVATE POWER AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 30-50 (1966).
4. V. KEY & W. CROUCH, supra note 3, at 432.
5. Some argue that constitutional amendments adopted by initiatives conflict with the
guarantee of the republican form of government found in the United States Constitution because they constitute government by direct democracy. See Note, supra note 2, at 733. The
United States Supreme Court has consistently held that this objection is political in nature and,
therefore, not justiciable. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962); Pacific States Tel. &
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).

6. Note, supra note 2, at 757; see also Fischer, Ballot Propositions: The Challenge of
Direct Democracy to State ConstitutionalJurisprudence, 11 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 43, 66
(1983); Note, The California Initiative Process: A Suggestion for Reform, 48 S. CAL. L. REV.
922 (1975). But see Briffault, Distrust of Democracy (Book Review) 63 TEX. L. REV. 1347
(1985) (reviewing D. MAGLEBY, DIRECT LEGISLATION: VOTING ON BALLOT PROPOSITIONS

INTHE UNITED STATES (1984)); Note, The Use of Extrinsic Aids in the Interpretationof Popularly EnactedLegislation, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 157 (1989).
7. Gordon & Magleby, Pre-Election Review of Initiatives and Referendums, 64 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 298, 301 (1989); see Fair Political Practices Comm'n v. Superior Court, 25 Cal.
3d 33, 599 P.2d 46, 157 Cal. Rptr. 855 (1979) (political reform), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1049
(1980); Santa Barbara School Dist. v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 315, 530 P.2d 605, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 637 (1975) (limitation on school busing); Weaver v. Jordan, 64 Cal. 2d 235, 411 P.2d
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strike down a fifth initiative was reversed by the United States Supreme
Court.8 Poor draftsmanship has also been common. The Jarvis-Gann
Initiative, also known as Proposition 13, which limited property taxes,
contained forty ambiguities in language that have required clarification
through extensive litigation. 9
This Article investigates one consequence of poor draftsmanshipinadequate guidance for implementation legislation. The lack of an implementation plan in Proposition 13 placed political pressure on the legislature to mitigate the effects of the initiative. The implementing
legislation violated longstanding constitutional principles.
The nature of the problem can be understood by reviewing the context of California's property tax revolt. When California voters approved
Proposition 13, they addressed a fiscal problem that the California Legislature had proved incapable of solving. While state government accumulated a large fiscal surplus, California residents incurred a large and
growing tax burden, especially for property taxes, compared to residents
in other states.10 In adding Article XIIIA to the California Constitution,
voters sought "effective real property tax relief.""1 To this end, voters
limited property tax rates and assessed valuations, and placed restrictions
on the ability of state and local governments to raise non-property
taxes. 2 The new limits cut the property tax revenues collected by cities,
counties, schools, and special districts in half. 3
The drafters sketched a framework for property tax limitation; however, they neglected to draft an implementation plan. They failed to explain how property tax limitation could be integrated into the
constitutional framework governing local fiscal affairs in California.
They did not even specify how the property taxes collected under the 1%
289, 49 Cal. Rptr. 537 (prohibition on pay television), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 84 (1966); Mulkey
v. Reitman, 64 Cal. 2d 529, 413 P.2d 825, 50 Cal. Rptr. 881 (1966) (repeal of open housing),
aff'd, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
8. People v. Ramos, 30 Cal. 3d 553, 639 P.2d 908, 180 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1982), rev'd, 463
U.S. 992 (1983) (death penalty statute enacted by initiative held unconstitutional).
9. See Note, supra note 2, at 757 n.97. For a discussion of the litigation, see Henke &
Woodlief, "TheEffect of Proposition 13 Court Decisions on Calfornia Local Government Revenue Sources, 22 U.S.F. L. REV. 251 (1988).
10. See J. RING, SECRETS OF THE TAX REVOLT 144-53 (1984); Oakland, Proposition
XIII-Genesis and Consequences, 32 NAT'L TAX J. 387, 388 (June Supp. 1979).
11. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208,
230-31, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 248-49 (1978).
12. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-4.
13. See CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE ANALYST, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EFFECT OF PROPOSI-

TION 13 ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS 3 (1979).
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limit were to be apportioned among local governments. 4 The legislature
had only three weeks to pass implementation legislation for "the most
significant fiscal act of the people of California in modem times." 15 The
outcome was legislation shaped by the politics of government spending
rather than legislation informed by long-standing principles that have
shaped California's constitutional history and case law.
In implementing Proposition 13, the Legislature was pressured to
protect local spending programs.16 The Legislature passed legislation
favoring local governments most dependent on property taxation before
Proposition 13.17 An emergency statute, Senate Bill (SB) 154,18 implemented Proposition 13 for the fiscal year (FY) 1978-79 for "the partial
relief of local government from the temporary difficulties brought about
by the approval of Proposition 13. " '9 The statute apportioned property
tax revenues and disbursed state bail-out monies on the basis of historical
property tax revenues.2 ° One year later, the Legislature passed Assembly
Bill (AB) 821 which apportioned property tax revenues for every subsequent fiscal year.2 2 While AB 8 included complex modifications of the
apportionment formula defined by SB 154, it still tied the apportionment
of property taxes to the amount of property tax revenues collected in
previous fiscal years.2 3
Few commentators or cases have addressed whether the Legislature
exceeded its constitutional authority when it apportioned property
14. Proposition 13 only required that those revenues be "apportioned according to law."
CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § l(a).
15. CALIFORNIA COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT REFORM, FINAL REPORT 1 (1979).

16. See Doerr, The CaliforniaLegislature'sResponse to Proposition13, 53 S. CAL. L. REV.
77, 88 (1979).
17. For a discussion of the Legislature's objectives, see Post, Effects of Proposition 13 on

the State of California,32 NAT'L TAX J. 381 (June Supp. 1979); see also Doerr, supra note 16,
at 78-79.
18. The Tax Justice Act of 1977, ch. 292, 1978 Cal. Stat. 582 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE (West 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West Supp.

1990).
19. See LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST TO SB 154 (1978); see also The Tax Justice Act
of 1977, ch. 292, § 15, 1978 Cal. Stat. 591 (codified at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16250 (West
1980)).
20. See Doerr, supra note 16, at 78-79; Post, supra note 17, at 381.
21. Act effective July 24, 1979, ci. 282, 1979 Cal. Stat. 959 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990)).
22. Id. § 59, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1025-27 (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 95 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990)).
23. Id. § 97.5.
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taxes. 24 This lack of scrutiny may reflect the belief that, under the broad

plenary power of state legislatures,25 the allocation of property taxes is
solely a policy question. But the plenary power of state legislatures is
limited by state constitutions.2 6 The California Constitution and case

law establish many principles that define California's "fiscal constitution."2 7 For the purposes of this Article, the important principles are tax
situs,2 8 tax uniformity, 29 and fiscal home rule.30 Together, they provide a

framework for how local fiscal arrangements should be structured after
Proposition 13.

In adopting SB 154 and AB 8, the Legislature violated sections l(b)
and 14 of article XIII of the California Constitution. Taxpayers living in

jurisdictions with low property tax rates before Proposition 13 now pay
property taxes that are apportioned, in part, to local governments that do
not serve them. This violates tax situs. 31 The same taxpayers also pay a

disproportionate share of their property taxes to county government in
comparison to taxpayers living in jurisdictions with high property tax
24. Most commentators generally examine the effect of the legislative implementation of
Proposition 13 on the revenues and expenditures of local governments. See, e.g., CALIFORNIA
AND THE AMERICAN TAX REVOLT: PROPOSITION 13 FIVE YEARS LATER (T. Schwadron ed.

1984); Rafuse, Proposition13: Initial Impacts on the Financesof FourCounty Governments, 32
NAT'L TAX J. 229 (June Supp. 1979). Most cases have addressed how Proposition 13 should
be implemented within the framework established by existing law. See, e.g., Carmon v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 318, 322, 644 P.2d 192, 194, 182 Cal. Rptr. 506, 508 (1982) (funding of voterapproved pension plans should be exempt from 1% tax limit). See Henke & Woodlief, supra
note 9, at 267-75, for a discussion of cases involving the meaning of key terms undefined in
Proposition 13-ad valorem tax, district, vote requirements, special tax, and assessments. The
California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 13 in Amador Valley
Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 239 (1978), and a state appellate court held that Proposition 13 implementation legislation did not violate equal protection or abrogate vested tax powers in Matin Hospital Dist. v.
Rothman. 139 Cal. App. 3d 495, 188 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1983). For a discussion of these cases,

see infra notes 190-223, 270-74 and accompanying text.
25. For a discussion of the broad plenary powers of state legislatures, see generally D.
MANDELKER, D.

NETSCH & P.

SALSICH, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN A FEDERAL

SYSTEM (2d ed. 1983) [hereinafter D. MANDELKER]; 0. REYNOLDS, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW (1982); S.SATO & A. VAN ALSTYNE, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW (1970).
26. D. MANDELKER, supra note 25, at 8; 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 25, at 74-94; see also
E. MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.05, at 15-16 (power to tax),

§ 44.06, at 23 (legislative power) (3d rev. ed. 1989); C. ANTIEAU, MUNICIPAL CORPORATION
LAW §§ 3.00, 3.16, at 3-5, 3-56 (1989).
27. See Dam, The American Fiscal Constitution, 44 U. CII. L. REV. 271 (1976) for development of the concept of a fiscal constitution-the "edifice of powers
cerning fiscal arrangements found in various sections of a constitution.
28. "All property taxed by local government shall be assessed in
district in which it is situated." CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
29. All property shall be taxed in proportion to its assessed value.
30. "The legislature may not impose local taxes for local purposes
31. See infra notes 478-84 and accompanying text.

and limitations" conId. at 272.
the county, city, and
Id.
....

§
."

1.
Id.

§

24.
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rates before Proposition 13. This violates tax uniformity.3 2 The Legislature's implementation plan is a multi-billion dollar constitutional violation 3 which was not required to achieve the intent of Proposition 13.
This Article proposes that these constitutional violations can be
remedied by a different apportionment of property taxes which requires
only simple modifications of existing law. Part I reviews the intent of
Proposition 13. Part II describes relevant implementation legislation.
Part III analyzes judicial decisions concerning the constitutionality and
meaning of Proposition 13. Part IV reviews pertinent economic and
legal principles of California's fiscal constitution before Proposition 13.
Part V explains how the apportionment of property taxes after Proposition 13 violated these principles even though they remain valid after
Proposition 13. Case studies demonstrate that the violations are fiscally
significant. Part VI describes remedies that allocate property taxes while
conforming with court decisions that have previously enforced California's fiscal constitution and have upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 13. The conclusion argues that the problems with existing law could
have been avoided if either Proposition 13's drafters or the Legislature
had devised an implementation plan based on a principled analysis of the
integration of the property tax limitation into California's fiscal
constitution.

I.

THE INTENT OF PROPOSITION

13

Proposition 13 was placed on the ballot amid widespread voter dissatisfaction with fiscal affairs in California. 34 The initiative's electoral
success was not guaranteed. For a decade, voters had rejected initiatives
proposing reform of California's property tax system. Moreover, the
Legislature had placed on the ballot a competitive constitutional amendment, Proposition 8, that offered homeowners property tax relief only if
voters defeated Proposition 13. In the past, the Legislature had won
35
head-to-head competition with initiatives.
Proposition 13 succeeded because California voters demanded reduced property taxation without increases in other local taxes or state
taxes. Neither the Legislature's competing amendment nor any prior initiative guaranteed this outcome. The official pre-election analyses made
32. See infra notes 491-501 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 503-37 and accompanying text.
34. See Citrin, Do People Want Somethingfor Nothing: Public Opinion on Taxes and Government Spending, 33 NAT'L TAX J. 113, 118 (June Supp. 1979); Levy, On Understanding
Proposition 13, 56 PUB. INT. 66, 70-74 (Summer, 1979).
35. See Levy, supra note 34, at 68-72.
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clear that Proposition 13 did not repeal tax situs, tax uniformity, or fiscal
home rule. The Legislature's competing amendment would have repealed tax uniformity,3 6 but it was rejected decisively by voters who supported Proposition 13.
A.

Prior Voter Initiatives

Many commentators trace the origins of California's tax revolt to
1967 when the legislature enacted the Petris-Knox bill.37 County assessors were required to reassess, within three years, all property at 25% of
market value and to reassess property frequently to keep that ratio intact. 38 This assessment procedure shifted the property tax burden away
from commercial and industrial properties and toward homeowners because, before 1967, single-family housing was assessed at a smaller fraction of market value than commercial and industrial properties. 39
Homeowner opposition to this shift in the burden of the property tax
spawned a series of tax reform initiatives.
In 1968, the "Watson Initiative" proposed a five-year plan to eliminate the use of property tax revenues to fund non-property tax related
services." The initiative would have limited property tax rates to 1% of
market value.4 During the election, debate centered around whether
state income and sales taxes would be raised to replace the revenues lost
by local governments.4 2 The voters defeated the Watson Initiative by a
margin of two to one because it failed to guarantee a reduction in the
43
overall level of government spending.
The Legislature responded by offering its own plan for property tax
relief. It passed California's first homeowner property tax exemption
which required voter approval of necessary constitutional amendments. 44
36. See ANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL (PROPOSITION 8 (SCA 6), THE BEHR BILL
(SB 1) AND PROPOSITION 13) 3 (April 27, 1978) [hereinafter ANALYSIS OF ATTORNEY GENERAL], reprintedin CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON LOCAL GOVERNMENTS, THE IMPACT OF PROPOSITION 13 (THE JARVIS-GANN PROPERTY TAX INITIATIVE)

ON LOCAL GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS AND SERVICES app. III, at 99 (1978).
37. See, e.g., Levy, supra note 34, at 68.
38. Act approved July 8, 1966, ch. 147, § 34, 1966 Cal. Stat. 658 (codified as amended at
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 401 (West 1987). See also Levy, supra note 34, at 68.
39. For example, single-family housing in San Francisco was assessed at 9% of market
value while commercial property was assessed at 35%. Levy, supra note 34, at 68.
40. For example, under the "Watson Initiative," property tax revenues for education and
welfare were to decline by 20% of 1969-70 levels until eliminated in 1973. Id. at 69.
41. Id.

42. Id.
43. Id. at 70.
44. Act approved Sept. 23, 1968, ch. 1, 1969 Cal. Stat. 7-8 (codified as amended at CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 218 (West 1987)).
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The first $750 of a homeowner's assessed valuation was exempted from
property taxation. a5 Increased state subventions replaced the revenues
lost by local governments. 4 6 Fifty-four percent of the voters supported
the Legislature's amendment.4 7
In June 1970, California voters considered Proposition 8, which proposed sweeping changes in governmental finance.4 " It called for increased homeowner's exemptions and increased state funding for local
welfare programs and education. 9 But Proposition 8 did not require local governments to reduce the property taxes levied on homeowners.
The lack of an explicit guarantee to reduce property taxes was responsible for the defeat of the initiative, which received only 28% of the vote. °
Two years later, the second Watson Initiative (Watson II) qualified
for the November 1972 ballot.5 1 Like the earlier, unsuccessful Watson
Initiative (Watson I), Watson II called for a limit on local property taxes
and for a shift to state financing of most educational and welfare programs.12 To fund the expansion of state spending,5 3 Watson II identified
specific state taxes-sales, liquor, cigarette, and corporate incomewhich would be increased. 4 With the threat of higher state taxes explicit, the voters resoundly defeated Watson II by a margin of three to
55
one.
After the November 1972 election, the Legislature completed a
"moderate" alternative to Watson II. It increased the homeowner's ex57
emption to $1,750,56 introduced a modest income-tax credit for renters,
and placed limits on the property tax rates levied by local governments5 8
and the expenditure levels of school districts.5 9
45. Id.
46. Levy, supra note 34, at 71.

47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Act effective Mar. 3, 1978, ch. 24, §§ 27, 40.5, 1978 Cal. Stat. 95, 103 (1978) (codified
respectively as amended at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 2350, 50015 (West 1987)).
50. Levy, supra note 34, at 71.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 72.
56. Property Tax Relief Act of 1972, ch. 1406, § 13, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2958-59 (codified as
amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 218 (West 1987)).

57. Id. § 25, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2977 (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE
§ 17053.5 (West Supp. 1990)).
58. Id. § 14.7, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2961 (repealed 1973).
59. Id. § 2, 1972 Cal. Stat. 2948-53 (codified as amended at CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 4223042302 (West 1978 & Supp. 1990)).
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The final unsuccessful initiative for tax reform was Proposition 1.60
Introduced in 1973, this initiative proposed explicit limitations on state
spending.6 1 Opponents argued that the limit on state spending would
result in higher local taxes in order to pay for the services previously
funded by state taxes.6 2 The fear of higher local taxes defeated Proposition 1, which received 44% of the vote.6 3
Despite the failure of tax reform initiatives, the political support for
fiscal reform grew. By the mid-1970s, residential property values were
increasing at an annual rate of 15%.1 4 In contrast, assessments of commercial properties were growing slowly because they were based on their
estimated income potential which was stagnant. 6 - Local governments
could not reduce their property tax rates by significant amounts because
the California Constitution required that equal rates be levied on residential and commercial properties. 66 Therefore, any reductions in property
taxes of homeowners would have sacrificed collection of property taxes
from commercial and industrial properties. The limits on property tax
rates imposed by the Legislature in 1972 also proved ineffective in providing tax relief. The limits did not mandate reductions in rates; they
only prevented further increases in property tax rates.67 The problem for
California taxpayers was not rising property tax rates,68 but rising property taxes because tax rates did not fall fast enough to offset the rapid
growth in assessed valuations. The political climate was ripe for Proposition 13.
60. Levy, supra note 34, at 72.
61. Id. at 73.

62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 76.
66. Id.; see CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(b).
67. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 2260-2267 (West 1987). Levy, supra note 34, at 77.
In general, maximum tax rates were set at the level levied in either 1971-72 or 1972-73. The
governing body could select which year defined the maximum. Levies for voter-approved debt,
federal and state mandated costs, and outstanding pension programs and other contracts were
exempted from the rate limit.
68. Levy, supra note 34, at 77. In fact, property tax rates declined by 5% between 1974
and 1978. Lefcoe & Allison, The Legal Aspects ofProposition 13: The Amador Valley Case, 53
S. CAL. L. REV. 173, 197 (1979).
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B.

The ElectoralSuccess of Proposition13

Proposition 13 was successful because its provisions responded to
the arguments used against the unsuccessful initiatives.6 9 The Legislature's competing amendment, Proposition 8, was defeated because it did
not meet voter demand for effective property tax relief without increased
state taxes or local non-property taxes.
The major sections of Proposition 13 as codified define a comprehensive approach to property tax limitation.7 ° The first section defines
the property tax limit:
1(a) The maximum amount of any ad valorem tax on real
property shall not exceed one percent (1%) of the full cash
value of such property. The one percent (1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to law to the
districts within the counties.
l(b) The limitation provided for in subdivision (a) shall not apply to ad valorem taxes or special assessments to pay the interest and redemption charges on any indebtedness approved by
the voters prior to the time this section becomes effective.7 1
Section 2 rolls back assessed valuations to the levels prevailing in 1975-76
and caps increases in valuations at 2% per year until a property is sold.7 2
Section 3 requires that any changes in state taxes, whether by increased
rates or change in methods of computation, be approved by two-thirds of
all members elected to both houses of the Legislature, except new ad
valorem taxes on real property are prohibited.7 3 Section 4 requires a
two-thirds vote in a special election before cities, counties, and special
districts can impose special taxes, except new ad valorem taxes on real
property were prohibited. 74 All four sections were necessary for the electoral success of Proposition 13.
Sections 1 and 2 were both required for effective property tax relief.
69. When it upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 13, the California Supreme Court
also took the view that the various sections of Proposition 13 were "reasonably germane" to
each other to achieve the goal of effective property tax relief. Amador Valley Joint Union
High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 230, 583 P.2d 1281, 1290, 149 Cal.
Rptr. 239, 248 (1978). The court, however, did not relate the provisions of Proposition 13 to
the criticisms of past failed initiatives.
70. CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA, §§ 1-4. Proposition 13 also had two other sections. Section
5 stipulated when article XIIIA was to become effective. Id. § 5. Section 6 contained a "severability" clause so that if any section was declared unconstitutional, the remaining sections
would remain in force. Id. § 6.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

§
§
§
§

1.
2.
3.
4.
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They responded to the criticism of Proposition 8 that tax-limit initiatives
do not guarantee reductions in property taxes. 7 5 A tax rate limit alone

would not have addressed the plight of homeowners, because the burden
on homeowners before Proposition 13 was caused by increased assess-

ments, not rising property tax rates. 76 A roll-back of assessments and
caps on future increases in assessed valuations was politically necessary.
Without section 2, local governments could still raise larger amounts of

revenue from property taxes. Sections 3 and 4 placed obstacles in the
path of any attempts to circumvent the fiscal restraint imposed by prop-

erty tax limits. By restricting the ability of the Legislature to increase
state taxes, section 3 assured that property tax limits need not result in
higher state taxes as advocated by the discredited Watson I and Watson

II initiatives. By restricting the ability of local governments to raise local
taxes, section 4 guaranteed that property tax relief need not be offset by

an increase in other local taxes-a fear which defeated Proposition 1 in
1972. 77

In contrast, the Legislature's competing amendment did not provide
constitutionally guaranteed property tax relief. Proposition 8 simply authorized the legislature to provide for taxation of owner-occupied property at a rate lower than that levied on other property.7" As observed by

the Attorney General, "it is an enabling act only; it is up to the legislature to establish the rates."' 79 Proposition 8's only connection to tax relief was through the Behr Bill, which the Legislature had passed before

the election. 0
Four portions of the Behr Bill are relevant to the discussion."

First,

the property tax rate on owner-occupied dwellings would have been reduced by 30%; the tax rates on other property would have been main75. Levy, supra note 34, at 71.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 73.
78. Senate Constitutional Amendment 6, Res. ch. 85, Cal. Stat. 1977.
79. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 36, at 3.
80. Act of March 3, 1978 (commonly referred to as the Behr Bill), ch. 24, 1978 Cal. Stat.
85 (1978) (codified as amended at CAL. GOV'T CODE § 27421 (West 1988); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE §§ 2260, 2264, 2265, 2305-2309, 2325, 2325.1, 2611.5, 1149, 11403, 17053.5, 17505,
20542, 20543, 20544 (West 1983 & Supp. 1989)).
81. Id. See also ANALYSIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 36, at 3-4. The bill
contained other provisions that would have: (1) increased the amount of renter's credit under
the state's personal income tax; Act of March 3, 1978 (commonly referred to as the Behr Bill),
ch. 24, § 32, 1978 Cal. Stat. 98 (codified as amended at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17053.5
(West Supp. 1989)); and (2) reduced the share of costs for welfare and MediCal programs
shouldered by county governments; id. § 42, 1978 Cal. Stat. 106-09.
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tained.8 2 Second, maximum property tax rates for local governments
would have been recomputed so that local agencies would not receive
more property tax revenues than the amount received in the prior year,
adjusted by an inflation factor,83 plus increases in assessed valuation due
84
to new construction and substantial improvements to existing property.
Third, a limit on state revenue would have been established equalling the
revenue for the prior fiscal year adjusted by the percentage increase in
California personal income multiplied by the 1.2 "revenue elasticity factor."8 5 Revenues above the limit, so-called excess revenues, would have
been restricted to specified uses-additional property tax relief programs,
reduction of state taxes, maintenance of a surplus not exceeding 3% of
total revenues, declared emergencies, and funding revenue-sharing programs with local agencies. 86 Finally, the bill would be repealed unless
voters approved Proposition 8 and rejected Proposition 13.87
Voters did the opposite. Proposition 13 received 64.8% of the
vote,8 8 carrying fifty-five of the state's fifty-eight counties which accounted for 95% of the state's population.8 9 Proposition 8 received
47.1% of the vote,9" carrying only fifteen counties which accounted for
30% of the state's population. 91
Voters who supported Proposition 13 opposed Proposition 8. There
was almost a one-for-one offset between the share of the countywide vote
cast for Proposition 13 and the share of the countywide vote cast for
Proposition 8. For each percentage point increase in the vote in favor of
92
Proposition 13, the vote in favor of Proposition 8 was lower by 0.9%.
82. Act of March 3, 1978 (commonly referred to as the Behr Bill), ch. 24, § 27, 1978 Cal.
Stat. 95.
83. Id. § 10, 1978 Cal. Stat. 87-91 (The percentage change in the cost of goods and services
purchased by state and local governments reported in the GNP deflator).
84. Id.
85. Id. 1978 Cal. Stat. 103. Therefore, applying this formula, if personal income increased
by 10%, the state revenue limit would increase by 12%. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id. § 47, 1978 Cal. Stat. 110.
88. Salzman, Outlook for November, CAL. J., July 1980, at 219.
89. Id. Proposition 13 failed to carry only Kern, San Francisco, and Yolo Counties. Id.
The percentage of population residing in counties approving Proposition 13 has been computed from estimated population of California counties on June 30, 1978. CALIFORNIA STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, Table 1, at 1 (1979).

90. Salzman, supra note 88, at 219.
91. See supra note 89 for computation of percent of state population residing in counties
approving Proposition 8.
92. Consider the following regression analysis relating the share of the vote cast in favor of
Proposition 8 (P8) to the share of the vote cast in favor of Proposition 13 (P13). If the support
for Proposition 13 was independent of the support for Proposition 8, then there should be no
relation between the vote shares for the Propositions-the coefficient for the variable P13
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Voters who sought property tax relief understandably supported
Proposition 13, not Proposition 8. Proposition 13 offered constitutionally guaranteed property tax relief with provisions against raising state
taxes or other local taxes.93 Proposition 8 only proposed to amend the
California Constitution to allow non-uniform property taxation.9 4 While

the passage of Proposition 8 and the defeat of Proposition 13 would have
implemented the Legislature's property tax relief program, Proposition
13 more effectively addressed two issues that had dominated the history

of tax reform initiatives.
First, Proposition 13 offered homeowners the greatest property tax
relief. Proposition 13 would immediately reduce property taxes on
owner-occupied property by twice as much as the Behr Bill. 95 In addition, Proposition 13 would limit the growth in property taxes to 2% per

year until homeowners sold their property. 96 Despite the "maximum

property tax rates" in the Behr Bill, property taxes under the Legislature's bill would grow much faster because the basis of calculating taxa97
ble assessed valuations would have been unchanged.
Second, Proposition 13 addressed attempts to circumvent tax limits;
the Behr Bill did not. The state revenue limit would still have allowed
state expenditures to grow 20% faster than state personal income. 98 In
should be zero. Using the voting results from the fifty-eight counties in California, the estimated equation is the following (numbers in parentheses are t-statistics, the ratio of the estimated coefficient to its standard error):
P8 = 1.05 - 0.934 P13, R2=.699
(19.68)
(-11.40)
The coefficient for the variable measuring Proposition 13 vote share measures the effect of
support for Proposition 13 on the vote share of Proposition 8 that is discussed in the text. The
t-statistic indicates that this measured effect is statistically significant-the probability that the
estimated coefficient would be -. 934 if its true value were zero is less than I in 100,000.
Therefore, there is strong statistical support for the view that voters who supported Proposition 13 also rejected Proposition 8.
93. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of the provisions of
Proposition 13.
94. See supra text accompanying note 82.
95. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 36, at 9-10. The comparison of
the tax relief programs involved the amount of tax relief on a $47,000 home. The Behr Bill
would reduce property tax payments by $360. Proposition 13 would reduce property tax payments by $740. Id.
96. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2.
97. As commented by the Attorney General, the combined effect of Proposition 8 and the
Behr Bill would have no effect on assessed valuation. ANALYSIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 36, at 10. Furthermore, the limits on property tax rates would allow property taxes to increase by the rate of inflation plus the rate of increase in assessed valuations due
to new construction or improvements in existing property. See supra notes 83-84 and accompanying text.
98. The 1.2 "elasticity revenue factor" in the proposed limit would mean that state reve-
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addition, the excess of state revenues over the limit need not result in tax
relief. It would have been permissible to use the funds for "declared"
emergencies and for revenue-sharing programs with local governments.
Proposition 13 therefore assured that property tax limitation would yield
spending cuts while Proposition 8 did not.
C. The Meaning of Proposition 13
The voters' message was clear: reduce property taxes collected by
local governments and cut government spending. These views dominated the ballot analyses and post-election commentary and are consistent with how Proposition 13 later reversed the trends in local and state
finances that had prompted the tax revolt. Neither the ballot analysis
nor the post-election commentary indicated that Proposition 13 intended
to repeal tax situs, tax uniformity, or fiscal home rule powers of local
governments.
Official ballot analyses made clear that Proposition 13 involved
property tax limitation, not repeal of constitutional principles concerning
property taxation. The Attorney General's summary stated that Proposition 13 "limits ad valorem taxes on real property."9 9 The summary
also stated the financial impact of Proposition 13 to be "annual losses of
local government property tax revenues. ' ' l ° The analysis by the Legislative Analyst states that Proposition 13 "place[s] a limit on the amount of
property taxes that could be collected by local governments." 10' In short,
no official analysis characterized Proposition 13 as repealing local powers
to tax property.
The view that Proposition 13 did not change the constitutional principles of property taxation is consistent with how the Legislative Counsel
addressed two of the many ambiguities in the draftsmanship of Proposition 13. The relevant ambiguities involved section l(a). The first ambiguity involved the language that "[t]he maximum amount of any ad
valorem tax on real property shall not exceed one percent."'' 0 2 In California, the total property tax roll includes county assessments on real
property (land and buildings) and personal property as well as state assessments on public utilities and railroads.l03 If the limit only applied to
nues could grow 20% faster than state personal income. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
99. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, 56 (June 6, 1978) (emphasis added).

100.
101.
102.
103.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 57 (emphasis added).
Id. at 56.
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real property, then county-assessed personal property as well as all stateassessed property would be excluded from the tax limit. The Legislative
Counsel concluded that the 1% limit would apply to all types of taxable
property."° Otherwise, Proposition 13 would have resulted in non-uniform taxation of property in California because real property would have
been under the 1% limit and other property would have been outside the
1% limit. Such a scheme would conflict with article XIII, section 1(b) of
the California Constitution which requires uniform tax rates.15
The second ambiguity involved the language "[t]he one percent
(1%) tax to be collected by the counties and apportioned according to
law to the districts within the counties." 1 6 Under California law, cities
and counties are not "districts."' 1 7 If property taxes were only apportioned among "districts," then cities and counties would no longer receive property tax revenues. The Legislative Counsel concluded that
unless the ballot arguments by the proponents of Proposition 13 made it
clear that counties and cities are to be excluded from the apportionment
of property taxes, these local governments could be included in the apportionment of property taxes.1l0 If the Legislative Counsel had held
otherwise, denying the power of counties and cities to collect property
taxes could have been possibly viewed as the intent of Proposition 13. In
FY 1977-78, the last fiscal year before Proposition 13 was passed, counties and cities had collected, respectively, 28.9% and 13.3% of all property taxes.' 0 9 In the absence of explicit language, the Legislative Counsel
refused to read such a radical change in California's fiscal arrangements
as the intent of Proposition 13. The proponents did not express in their
ballot arguments an intent to prevent counties and cities from collecting
property taxes. 110
Instead, the ballot arguments concentrated on the wisdom of property tax limitation and cutbacks in local spending. Proponents advocated
that Proposition 13 would "[1]imit property tax to 1% of market value,
require two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature to raise any other
taxes, limit yearly market value tax raises to 2% per year, and require all
104. Id.
105. "All property so assessed shall be taxed in proportion to its full value." CAL. CONST.
art. XIII, § l(b).
106. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 57.
107. Id. See also ANALYSIS OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, supra note 36, at 7.
108. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 57.

109. See Smith, Local FiscalArrangements afterProposition 13 in PROPOSITION 13: A TEN
YEAR RETROSPECTIVE Table 1 (F. Stocker ed. 1989) (Lincoln Institute of Land Policy) [here-

inafter Local FiscalArrangements].
110. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 58.
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other tax raises to be approved by the people." ' They did not discuss
repealing tax situs, tax uniformity, or any other constitutional principle.
The proponents also argued that "[a] 1% limit would still leave property
tax revenue far above the level required to pay for property-related governmental services, street lighting maintenance, sewers, trash collection,
and POLICE AND FIRE PROTECTION."11' 2 They added that "[t]he
amendment ...DOES NOT prohibit the use of property tax money for
schools."'1 3 In sum, the proponents linked the property taxes collected
under the 1% limit to the funding of services provided by local governments. As was the case before Proposition 13, property taxation was to
remain a local tax after Proposition 13.
Opponents based their arguments primarily on the fiscal implications of property tax limitation, not constitutional considerations. They
argued that "Proposition 13 invites economic and governmental chaos in
California," and warned that "[i]t will drastically cut police and fire protection and bankrupt schools unless massive new tax burdens are imposed on California taxpayers."' "1 4 In other words, opponents
disapproved of the impending loss of revenues for local governments and
any cuts in spending required by the loss of such revenues. Opponents
argued that Proposition 13 would "take decision-making away from the
local level and weaken home rule""' 5 but did not specify how home rule
would be weakened." 6 The shift of decisionmaking from local to state
government was based on the belief that state taxes would be "inevitably" increased to offset the loss in-property tax revenues. 1 7 In sum, not
even the opponents argued that Proposition 13 would change the constitutional principles governing property taxation in California.
The view that Proposition 13 promised nothing for defenders of rising property taxes, state taxes, or other local taxes finds support from the
fiscal events since 1978. Proposition 13 achieved a permanent 54% re111. Id.
112. Id. (emphasis and capitalization in original).
113. Id. (capitalization in original).
114. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 59.

115. Id.
116. Opponents offered more explicit arguments when they challenged the constitutionality
of Proposition 13. They argued that Proposition 13 violated home rule provisions of the California Constitution. Id. The California Supreme Court rejected these arguments. See
Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 227, 583
P.2d 1281, 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1978); see infra notes 190-223 and accompanying
text for a discussion of Amador.
117. "Shocking increases in state and local taxes are virtually inevitable." CALIFORNIA
VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 59.
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duction in property taxes."'1 It also halted the growth of state and local
taxes. I19 In the eighteen years prior to Proposition 13, the total share of
state personal income taken by state and local taxes steadily increased
from 11.29%, in FY 1960-61, to 15.44% by FY 1977-78.12o After Proposition 13, that share dropped immediately to 11.87% and has not grown
since that time.121 Contrary to the ballot arguments offered by the opponents to Proposition 13, other local taxes and state taxes were not increased to offset reduced revenues from property taxes. 122 The steady
growth in the share of personal income taken by the non-property taxes
levied by state and local government was reversed after Proposition
13.123 Proposition 13's call for fiscal restraint has been heeded.
The electoral victory of Proposition 13 has also been interpreted as
widespread acceptance of other fiscal principles. Voters expressed a preference for greater control over budgetary decisions. 124 They also stated a
preference about the composition of government spending, demanding
more spending on police, schools, fire protection, and demanding less on
welfare, parks, and highways. 125 These lessons were not lost on politicians. In response to Proposition 13, counties and cities favored spending cuts on administration, health and public aid, and public works over
spending cuts on public safety. 126 The League of California Cities, which
had opposed Proposition 13,127 derived the following lessons from voter
support of Proposition 13:
(1) property taxes should be used primarily for property-related services;
118. See R. Smith, Constitutional Reform Gone Awry: The Legislative Implementation of
Proposition 13, 16 n.32 (Oct. 23, 1987) (unpublished manuscript on file at Lowe Institute of
Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College) [hereinafter Constitutional Reform].
119. Id. at 18-19.
120. Id. at 16-17.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 19.
123. By the mid-1980s, that share was 0.5% below the peak share attained in the last fiscal
year before Proposition 13 became effective. Id.
124. D. SEARS & J. CITRIN, TAX REVOLT: SOMETHING FOR NOTHING IN CALIFORNIA
244 (2d ed. 1985).
125. Id. at 48.
126. In response to Proposition 13, county governments reduced their expenditures on general government by 48%, on health and public aid by 28%, on recreation by 30%, but reduced
their spending on public safety by only 16% and on public works by 13%. Local Fiscal Arrangements,supra note 109, Table 11. City governments reduced their spending on general
government by 21%, on health and public aid by 14%, on public works by 15%, on recreation
by I1%, but reduced spending on public safety by only 5%. Id.
127. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 59.
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(2) local services such as schools, health, and welfare should be
funded at the state level with non-property taxes;
(3) future growth in spending should be paid for by special
1 28
taxes approved by the voters or financed by existing budgets.
Proposition 13's message was clear, and its opponents quickly challenged it in the Legislature.
II.

IMPLEMENTING LEGISLATION: THE APPORTIONMENT OF

PROPERTY TAXES
After the election, political attention turned to how the legislature
would implement Proposition 13. What supporters of local government
spending lost at the ballot box they vigorously defended in the halls of
the Legislature. They sought an apportionment of property taxes and a
state bail-out of local governments that protected local spending.129 The
discussion concentrated on the apportionment of property taxes under
SB 154,130 an emergency statute to allocate property tax revenues for FY
1978-79, and AB 8"3 which modified the apportionment formula defined
by SB 154. The resulting tax allocations translated the 1% tax limit into
a set of maximum tax rates for local governments. During recent legislative sessions, the Legislature has amended existing law to increase the
property tax allocation received by cities that levied no or low property
tax rates before Proposition 13. Economic and legal analysis requires a
detailed understanding of the complex provisions in these statutes.
A.

Setting the Rules for FY 1978-79

The Legislature prohibited local governments from levying ad
valorem property taxes other than those necessary to service voter-approved debt exempted from the 1% tax limit. 32 The Legislature directed county governments to levy the 1% property tax on behalf of local
128. League of California Cities, Legislative Bulletin (Apr. 20, 1978).
129. For a discussion of state bail-out programs and subventions see Constitutional Reform,
supra note 118, at 22-24; see also Doerr, supra note 16, at 77-78.
130. The Tax Justice Act of 1977, ch. 292, 1978 Cal. Stat. 582 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of CAL. EDUC. CODE (West 1989); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980); CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INsT. CODE (West Supp.

1990).
131. Act effective July 24, 1979, ch. 282, 1979 Cal. Stat. 959 (codified as amended in scat-

tered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); CAL. REV. & TAX.
CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990)).
132. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § l(b).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:829

governments 133 and to allocate the collected revenues among local governments that levied a property tax in FY 1977-78.134 County auditors
were instructed to use a two-stage computation based on the historical
collection of property tax revenues, exclusive of debt levies. 1 35 In effect,
property tax revenues were allocated in proportion to the amount of
property taxes collected before Proposition 13.
The first stage divided FY 1978-79 property tax revenues into two
categories: local agencies (cities, county, special districts) and school

agencies (school districts, county superintendent of schools, community
college districts). 1 36 The local agency share equalled the total amount of

tax revenue raised under the 1% limit multiplied by the fraction that
local agencies collected of countywide property tax revenues in FY 1977-

countywide property tax revenues mi78.137 The school share equalled
138
nus the local agency share.
The second stage divided the local agency share among local agencies and the school share among school entities. 139 The revenue pool for
local agencies was divided among local agencies on the basis of property

taxes collected during the three fiscal years before Proposition 13."" The
revenue pool for schools was divided among schools on the basis of prop-

erty taxes collected in the fiscal year before Proposition 13.1"1
133. Id. § l(a); see Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22
Cal. 3d 208, 227, 583 P.2d 1281, 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1978).
134. This eligibility requirement excluded 31 of the more than 400 cities in California from
receiving property tax monies.
135. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26912 (West 1988).
136. Id. § 26912(b)(1). Countywide property tax revenues included state reimbursement
for homeowners and business inventory exemptions, subject to allocation and payment of
funds as provided for in subdivision (b) of section 33670 of the Health and Safety Code. Id.
§ 26912(b).
137. Id. § 26912(b)(1)(A).
138. Id. § 26912(b)(2)(A).
139. Id. § 26912(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B).
140. Id. § 26912(b)(1)(B). Each local agency had a local agency factor-the average
amount of property taxes it received in the three fiscal years prior to FY 1978-79 divided by
the average amount of countywide property taxes received by all local agencies for the same
three fiscal years. Id. Each local agency then received a property tax allocation for FY 197879 equal to their local agency factor multiplied by the local agency share. Id.
141. Id. § 26912(b)(2)(B). Each school entity had a schoolfactor-the amount of property
tax revenues it received in FY 1977-78 divided by the amount of countywide property tax
revenues received by all school entities in FY 1977-78. Id. Each school entity received a
property tax allocation for FY 1978-79 equal to the school share multiplied by their school
factor. Id.
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B.

Making the Rules Permanent

When it passed AB 8,142 the Legislature shifted the apportionment
of property tax revenues away from school entities and toward local
agencies. It also defined property tax allocations on the basis of tax rate
areas."4 3 It divided property tax allocations of each local government
into two components: (1) the amount allocated in the prior fiscal year,
and (2) a share of the additional property taxes collected because taxable
assessed valuations grew in tax rate areas served by each local government. 1" In implementing these changes, the Legislature faced a troubling problem-SB 154 had allocated property tax revenues in FY 197879 without regard to tax rate areas.145
The Legislature devised apportionment formulae that made SB
154's approach seem simple. One set of rules applied to FY 1979-80 and
another set to FY 1980-81 and thereafter.14 6 Moreover, one set of rules
applied to local agencies and another set to school entities.14 7 Property
tax allocations were adjusted to take account of the monies received by
redevelopment agencies.14 8 Despite these changes, the apportionment of
property taxes remained tied to historical collections of property taxes.
1. Local agencies in FY 1979-80
Each local agency received a base allocation equal to its allocation in
FY 1978-79 149 plus a fraction of state assistance received from the state
financed bail-out of local governments in FY 1978-79.15o The revised
142. Act effective July 24, 1979, ch. 282, 1979 Cal. Stat. 959 (codified in scattered sections
of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE (West 1989 &
Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE (West
1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990)).
143. A tax rate area is "a specific geographic area all of which is within the jurisdiction of
the same combination of local agencies and school entities." CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 95(g)
(West 1987).

144. Id. § 96.
145. Id. § 97.5(f).
146. Id. §§ 96, 97.

147. Id. § 100(b).
148. Id. § 98.5. Pursuant to article XVI, section 16 of the California Constitution, the legislature passed the Community Redevelopment Act in which redevelopment agencies can be
formed to remove "blight." CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33385 (West Supp. 1990).

149. Each local agency's property tax allocation for FY 1978-79 included a recomputation
of the FY 1978-79 allocation for any city which levied a utility user's tax prior to 1978 but
repealed such tax prior to December 31, 1977. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 96(d) (West 1987).
For such cities, property tax revenues for the three fiscal years before Proposition 13 were now
deemed to include the proceeds from the utility user's tax. Id.
150. State assistance equals (1) for counties, the amount of bail-out funds increased by the
amount specified in section 94 of chapter 282 of Statutes of 1979, with the resultant sum

reduced by an amount derived from calculation pursuant to section 16713 of the Welfare and
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base was then attributed to tax rate areas within the local agency's

boundaries on the basis of taxable assessed valuation. 51 The FY 1979-80
allocation for a local agency equalled the sum, over all tax rate areas

within its boundaries, of its base allocations and its allocation of the annual tax increment (growth in property taxes due to increased assessed

valuations).152 The allocation method for the annual tax increment is
discussed below. 153
The property tax allocations of special districts were then adjusted

for financial transactions associated with the Special DistrictAugmentation Fund (SDAF).

54

Special districts had their property tax allocation

reduced by an amount related to the state assistance they had received in
FY 1978-79.111 The size of the countywide SDAF equalled the sum of
all such contributions.1 1 6 Each county's Board of Supervisors would decide how the funds would be distributed among special districts.1 57 The
final property tax allocation for special districts equalled their original

unadjusted allocation, plus their allocation of the annual tax increment,
less their contribution to the SDAF, plus allocations received from the

SDAF.
2.

School entities in FY 1979-80

The property tax allocations for school entities reflected the shift in
tax base toward local agencies. The legislature revised the school entity
Institutions Code; (2) for cities, 82.91% of the bail-out funds plus one-half of any outstanding
debt for museums in FY 1977-78; (3) for special districts, 95.24% of bail-out funds and
amounts received pursuant to chapter 12 of the Statutes of 1979. Id. § 95(h)(l)-(3).
151. Id. § 98(f)(1)-(2). The revised base for a local agency in a tax rate area the revised
base of the local agency multiplied by the attributionfactorsfor tax rate areas-the ratio of a
tax rate area's taxable assessed valuation to the total taxable assessed valuation of the local
agency. See id. (defining attribution factors for tax rate area); see also id. § 96(a) (defining
amount of local agency revenue attributed to each tax rate area).
152. Id. § 96(c).
153. See infra note 162.
154. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98.6 (West 1987).
155. Their contribution to the SDAF equalled their unadjusted tax allocation multiplied by
their SDAF Contribution Ratio (amount of state assistance received in FY 1978-79 divided by
the sum of that assistance and property tax revenue received in FY 1978-79). Id. § 98.6(a)(1).
In 1984, the Legislature froze the contribution by independent special districts to the levels in
FY 1983-84. Act approved July 16, 1984, ch. 448, § 5, 1984 Cal. Stat. 1864-65 (codified as
amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98.6(a)(3) (West 1987)). Thereafter, the contribution
of a special district to the SDAF was the lesser of its unadjusted property tax allocation multiplied by its contribution ratio or its contribution limit. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98.6(a)(3)
(West 1987).
156. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98.6(a)(4) (West 1987).

157. See id. §§ 98.6(b)-(m) for description of the procedures followed and the factors considered in this allocation.
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share for FY 1979-80 to be the difference between the property tax allocations for all school entities in FY 1978-79 and total state assistance
received by local agencies in FY 1978-79.111 Each school entity received
a revised FY 1978-79 allocation equal to the countywide revised school

entity share multiplied by the share of FY 1978-79 School Entity Share

received by a school entity.15 9 The revised FY 1978-79 allocation was
then attributed among tax rate areas within its boundaries on the basis of
taxable assessed valuation. 1" The FY 1979-80 allocation of a school entity equalled the sum over all tax rate areas within its boundaries of the
16 1
base allocations and its allocation of the annual tax increment.
3.

Allocation of annual tax increment

The Legislature reserved its most complex formula to allocate the
annual tax increment. It instructed county auditors to use a six-step procedure. 162 In effect, the growth in property tax revenues generated
158. Id. § 96(b).
159. Id.
160. The attribution of school entity revenues to each tax rate area equalled the revised FY
1978-79 allocation for each school entity multiplied by the attribution factor for tax rate areas.
Id. These attribution factors equalled the ratio of a tax rate area's taxable assessed valuation to
the taxable assessed valuation of the school entity. Id. § 98(f)(3).
161. Id.
162. The six steps are the following:
(1) For each tax rate area, compute 1% of the growth in taxable assessed valuation. Growth
in property taxes levied in the tax rate area equals current year taxable assessed valuation for
the current year multiplied by the tax rate limit (4% before FY 1981-82, 1% thereafter) minus
taxable assessed valuation from the prior fiscal year multiplied by the tax rate limit. Id.
§ 98(a).
(2) For each tax rate area, compute a growth quotient by dividing the amount computed in
step (I) by the sum of the amounts so computed for all tax rate areas in the county. Id.
§ 98(b).
(3) Compute the annual tax increment as the difference between countywide property tax revenues and the amount allocated in the prior fiscal year. This difference equals (i) for FY 197980, property taxes levied less amount attributed under sections 96(a) and 96(b). Id. § 98(c); (ii)
for FY 1980-81 and thereafter, property taxes levied in current fiscal year less attributed revenues from prior fiscal year. Id. § 98(c).
(4) Determine the amount of growth in property taxes attributableto a tax rate area by multiplying the growth quotient computed in step (2) by the amount computed in step (3). Id.
§ 98(d).
(5) Define allocationfactorsfor the annual tax increment for a local government as the ratio of
its property tax allocation attributed to the tax rate area in the prior fiscal year to the attributed revenues of all local governments serving the tax rate area in the prior fiscal year. Id.
§ 98(e).
(6) Use allocation factors in step (5) to allocate growth in property tax revenues from a tax
rate area among local governments serving residents in tax rate area. Multiply the amount of
growth in countywide property taxes attributable to the tax rate area by the allocation factor of
the annual tax increment. Id.
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within each tax rate area was allocated among local governments serving
residents in that tax rate area in proportion to the base allocation each
local government received from that tax rate area in the previous fiscal
year. 16 3 The annual tax increment received by each local agency or
school entity equalled the sum of its allocations over all tax rate areas
within its boundaries. 164
4. Post FY 1979-80 allocations
For FY 1980-81 and thereafter, property tax allocations build on
computations at the level of tax rate areas. Each jurisdiction would receive a base allocation equal to the amount of property tax allocation
received from the tax rate area in the prior fiscal year, ignoring contributions to and receipts from the SDAF.165 The annual tax increment
would equal countywide property tax revenues in the current fiscal year
less total tax allocations of all local governments in the prior fiscal
year.1 66 This annual tax increment would then be allocated among local
governments serving the tax rate area by the allocation factors for the
annual tax increment. 167 Tax allocations received by special districts
were reduced by the amount of their mandatory contributions to the
SDAF and were increased by disbursements they received from the
68
SDAF.
The property tax allocations of local governments were reduced if
tax rate areas within their boundaries were located in a redevelopment
agency.1 69 Complying with the California Constitution, 170 the Legislature defined the increment in assessed valuation for a redevelopment
agency as the taxable assessed valuation of all tax rate areas within the
boundaries of the project, less afrozen base allocation (the assessed valuation of property within the project prior to the formation of the project). 71 To meet debt service, the redevelopment agency would receive
the property taxes collected from the 1% tax on the increment in assessed valuation. 7 2 The loss of property tax revenues to local govern163. Id. § 98(f)(2).

164. Id. § 98(f)(1).
165. Id. § 98(e).

166. Id.
167. See supra note 162.
168. CAL. REV. & TAX.
169. Id. § 98.5.

CODE

§ 98.6(a)(1) (West 1987).

170. See CAL. CONST. art. XVI,

§

16(a).

171. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 33670(a) (West Supp. 1990) (defining frozen
base assessed valuation); id. § 33670(b) (defining increment assessed valuation).
172. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98.5(a) (West 1987). This follows the provisions specified
in article XVI, section 16 of the California Constitution.
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ments would be apportioned among local governments serving the tax
rate areas within the redevelopment agency by the allocation factors used
to allocate the annual tax increment.17 3
C. The Tax Allocations Are Maximum Local Property Tax Rates
The legislation effectively defined maximum property tax rates for
local governments. Before each fiscal year, any local government could
request a reduction in its tax allocation.1 74 The rebated revenues would
reduce the property tax rate below 1% for taxpayers residing within the
boundaries of the local government.17 5 This local control over tax rates
is necessary for a tax to be locally imposed.176
The Legislature turned to other principles of local property taxation
when constructing the apportionment formula. It applied the concept of
tax uniformity when attributing among tax rate areas the property tax
allocations received by local governments in FY 1978-79.177 It allocated
the growth in property tax revenues among local governments on the
basis of situs.178 It allocated the homeowner's subvention on the same
basis as property tax revenues in order to meet its constitutional obligation to reimburse local governments for the loss of local revenues from
the homeowner's exemption.17 9 It allocated the loss of property tax revenues to redevelopment agencies to local governments serving tax rate areas within redevelopment agencies in order to meet the constitutional
requirement that redevelopment agencies only affect the tax base of local
1
173. Id.
174. Id. § 100.
175. Id.
176. McCabe v. Carpenter, 102 Cal. 469, 471, 36 P. 836, 838 (1894) (Legislature imposes
tax if local authorities lack discretion to determine magnitude of tax).
177. Before Proposition 13, when local governments levied uniform tax rates, each tax rate
area's share of property tax revenues received by a local government equalled the ratio of the
assessed valuation of that tax rate area to the assessed valuation of the local government. See
R. Smith, The Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues: Constitutional Problem, Fiscal
Consequences, and Remedies, 2-5 (Feb. 16, 1989) (unpublished manuscript on file at
Stratecon, Inc., Claremont, California). Note that this coincides with the definition of the
attributionfactorfor a tax rate area. See Act approved July 24, 1979, ch. 282, § 59, 1979 Cal.
Stat. 1029 (codified as amended at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 98(f)(1), (2) (West 1987)).
178. See supra notes 162-64 for a discussion of the allocation of the annual tax increment.
179. The legislature defined property tax revenues to include "the amount of state reimbursement for the homeowner's exemption." CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 95(d) (West 1987).
It defined taxable assessed valuation to be "total assessed value minus all exemptions other
than the homeowner's... exemption." Id. These definitions include state subventions for the
homeowner's exemption as part of local property taxation because the California Constitution
ties these state subventions to the property tax base of local governments. "The legislature
shall provide.. . reimbursements to each local government for revenue lost" from the homeowner's exemption. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 25 (emphasis added).
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governments whose jurisdictional boundaries include the redevelopment
180
project.
D.

Recent Amendments to the Revenue and Taxation Code

In recent sessions, the Legislature has adjusted the property tax allocation of cities and county governments. In 1987, it adopted SB 709181
which added section 97.35 to the Revenue and Taxation Code. In 1988,
the legislature passed AB 1197182 which repealed section 97.35 as added
by SB 709 and then added a new section 97.35 to the Revenue and Taxation Code.
Under SB 709, qualified cities would have received a Tax Equity
Allocation of 10 cents per $100 taxable assessed valuation, provided a
variety of other conditions were satisfied."8 3 Qualified cities were defined
as cities that levied no property taxes in FY 1977-78,184 that is the noproperty tax cities, or cities that would receive less than 10 cents per
$100 taxable assessed valuation pursuant to section 97 of the Revenue
and Taxation Code-the apportionment procedure described above.'
The additional property tax allocations received by qualified cities were
to be taken from the property tax allocations of county government, provided the county decided to participate in the Trial Court FundingAct.186
The payment of the 10 cent rate per $100 taxable assessed valuation
would be phased in over ten years-qualified cities receive one cent the
first year, two cents the second, and so on.187
AB 1197 replaced the 10 cent tax rate, ten-year phase-in period of
SB 709 with a 7 cent tax rate, seven-year phase-in period.' 8 8 It also
changed the definition of a qualified city to any city that received less
than a 7 cent tax property tax allocation.1 8 9
III. PROPOSITION 13 CASE LAW
Not all activity prompted by Proposition 13 was confined to the
halls of the legislature. Supporters and opponents of property tax limita180. See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text.
181. Act of Sept. 27, 1987, ch. 1211, § 47.6, 1987 Cal. Stat. 18 (repealed 1988).
182. Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944 §§ 5-6, 1988 Cal. Stat. 5-8 (codified at CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE § 97.35 (West Supp. 1990)).
183. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 97.35(5)(c) (West Supp. 1990).
184. Id. § 97.35(5)(d)(1).
185. Id. § 97.35(5)(d)(2).
186. Id. § 97.35(5)(g).
187. Id. § 97.35(5)(f)(1-10).
188. Id. § 97.35.
189. Id. § 97.35(d).
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tion entered the courtroom to explore the constitutionality and meaning
of Proposition 13. Case law has viewed Proposition 13 as simply a property tax limitation, not a major revision of the nature of local government
in California. Proposition 13 has been construed to avoid conflict with
other provisions in the California Constitution or the United States
Constitution.
A.

The Constitutional Challenge

In Amador Valley Joint Union High School Districtv. State Board of
Equalization,19 0 the California Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of Proposition 13 against a variety of challenges, two of which are
pertinent to this discussion. First, the petitioners argued that Proposition 13 was a constitutional revision, not an amendment, and therefore
required the approval of a constitutional convention or the Legislature
before being placed on the ballot.191 Since Proposition 13 was placed on
the ballot by initiative, the petitioners argued, it was invalid.1 9 a
The second challenge was that even if Proposition 13 was a legitimate initiative, it violated the single-subject requirement of the California
Constitution.19 3 The court's analysis considered the effect of Proposition
13 on constitutionally granted home rule powers of local governments,
especially taxation.' 9a With the exception of one dissent on another issue, 19 5 the court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of Proposition
13. 196
The revision-amendment issue centered on whether Proposition 13
190. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
191. Id. at 221, 583 P.2d at f84, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 242.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 224-27, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46. See CAL. CONST. art. II, § 8.
194. The plaintiffs only raised, and therefore the court only addressed, concerns about the
home rule powers found in article XI, sections 3 through 7 of the California Constitution.
Amador, 22 Cal. 3d. at 224-27, 583 P.2d at 1289, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245-46.
195. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 249, 583 P.2d at 1302-03, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird, C.J.,
dissenting in part).
196. Id. at 248, 583 P.2d at 1301-02, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 259. The other challenges included
violation of equal protection, id. at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250, interference
with the right to travel, id. at 237, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253, impairment of
contracts, id. at 258, 583 P.2d at 1295, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 253, improper initiative title and
summary, id. at 242, 583 P.2d at 1298, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 256, and vagueness, id. at 244, 583
P.2d at 1299, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 257. Justices Richardson, Tobriner, Mosk, Clark, Manuel, and
Newman upheld Proposition 13 against all challenges. Id. at 248, 583 P.2d at 1302, 149 Cal.
Rptr. at 259. Then-Chief Justice Bird concurred except on the issue of equal protection, which
she reasoned was violated by the assessment procedures required by article XIIIA, section 2.
Id. at 249, 583 P.2d at 1303, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 260 (Bird, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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implicitly abrogated other provisions of the California Constitution by
fundamentally altering the nature of local government. 197 Rather than
identify the distinguishing features of revisions and amendments in the
abstract, the court compared Proposition 13 with an earlier initiative
which the court had struck down as a revision.' 98 In McFadden v. Jordan,1 99 the court heard a challenge to the McFadden Initiative which
would have substantially altered fifteen of the twenty-five articles then
found in the California Constitution. 2" Among these changes, the initiative would have destroyed the power of cities and counties to tax and
regulate their budgets and expenditures. 0 1 The initiative would also
have limited those governments to a 2% gross receipts tax as the sole
means of taxing real and personal property.20 2 In effect, the initiative
would have revoked the power of local government to levy an ad valorem
tax on property.20 3 In Amador, the court concluded that, unlike the McFadden Initiative, Proposition 13 did not destroy or annul local taxing
powers."° Therefore, Proposition 13 was fundamentally different from
the revision called for by the McFadden Initiative.2 0
In reaching its decision, the Amador court rejected the view that the
implementation of Proposition 13 required abrogation of home rule.20 6
The principle of home rule allows local governments to control and finance local affairs without undue interference by the Legislature.20 7 Petitioners who opposed Proposition 13 argued that section l(a), which
required property taxes collected under the 1% limit to be "apportioned
according to law,"2 0 vested the legislature with the power to allocate
local property tax revenues "at its whim, and upon whatever conditions
it may impose, to pick and choose among the local agencies, rewarding
'deserving' agencies with substantial rewards while penalizing others by
reduced awards."20 9 The court concluded that nothing in the design of
Proposition 13 required such an outcome, or that the Proposition "dis197. See Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 68, at 181-85.
198. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 222, 583 P.2d at 1285, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 243 (citing McFadden

v. Jordan, 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949)).
199. 32 Cal. 2d 330, 196 P.2d 787 (1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
200. Id. at 345, 196 P.2d at 796.
201. Id. at 344, 196 P.2d at 796.
202. Id. at 336-37, 196 P.2d at 791.
203. Id. at 344, 196 P.2d at 791-92.
204. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
205. Id. at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
206. Id. at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
207. Id.
208. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 59; see also CAL. CONST. art.
XIIIA, § 1.
209. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
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close[d] any intent to undermine or subordinate preexisting constitu'
tional provisions on that subject." 21
The court also observed that SB
154211 did not appear to have the "pernicious character" feared by the
opponents to Proposition 13 because property tax allocations were not
212
conditioned on the ultimate use of the monies.
Furthermore, the Amador court concluded that Proposition 13 did
not destroy the taxation powers of local governments. It interpreted article XIIIA, section 4 as empowering local governments to levy special
taxes.2 13 The court also noted that a property tax limitation should not
be confused with the revocation of the power to tax property. 2 14 For
many decades, the legislature had the power to impose "maximum property tax rates and bonding limits for local governments. ' 215 In fact, the
legislature had exercised that authority in 1972, when it set maximum
property tax rates for local governments.2 16 Therefore, Proposition 13
simply required the legislature to impose a more stringent maximum on
property tax rates.21 7 The court interpreted SB 154 as requiring that
"the new one percent maximum tax is to be levied by the counties on
behalf of all local agencies and districts. ' 21 8 The court did not conclude
that Proposition 13 revoked the power of local governments to collect
property taxes. Rather, Proposition 13 simply limited property tax collections by local governments.21 9
Once the Amador court held Proposition 13 was an amendment, it
quickly dismissed the claim that Proposition 13 violated the single-subject requirement for ballot initiatives. 220 The court concluded that an
initiative does not violate the single-subject requirement "if, despite its
varied and collateral effects, all of its parts are 'reasonably germane' to
each other."'22' The court held that the four major sections of Proposition 13 were reasonably germane to the purpose of achieving effective
property tax relief, without any offsetting increase in other state or local
210. Id.
211. The Tax Justice Act of 1977, ch. 292, 1978 Cal. Stat. 582 (codified in scattered sections
at CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 110-110.6, 2217-35 (West 1983)).
212. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 227, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
213. Id. at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIII,
§ 20).
216. Id. at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 246, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258 (emphasis added).
219. Id. at 247, 583 P.2d at 1301, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
220. Id. at 232, 583 P.2d at 1292, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 250.
221. Id. at 230, 583 P.2d at 1290, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 248.
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taxes.2 In reaching its conclusion, the court did not review the history
of tax reform initiatives in California. Neither did it have access to information on the effects of Proposition 13 on the subsequent growth of taxation in California. Nevertheless, that history supports the court's
conclusion about the intent of Proposition 13.223
B.

Other Court Battles

Once the constitutionality of Proposition 13 was determined, litigation turned to the interpretation of specific provisions of Proposition 13
and to challenges of implementation legislation. California courts have
applied a standard rule of constitutional construction: If possible, interpret one constitutional provision so that it does not imply the repeal of
another.2 24
In Sonoma County Organization of Public Employees v. County of
Sonoma,2 25 the California Supreme Court declared portions of the implementing legislation of Proposition 13 unconstitutional because it violated
the Contracts Clause of the United States Constitution and the California
Constitution, 226 and it abrogated the home rule powers of cities and
counties.22 7 The case involved a condition imposed by the legislature on
the allocation of state bail-out funds-any local agency receiving state
funds could not grant its employees a greater cost-of-living wage or salary increase for FY 1978-79 than received by state employees.228 The
Legislature's stated purpose was to "allow essentially local government
services to be maintained at a higher level than would otherwise be the
case;"' 22 9 limiting the salaries of local employees was intended to "allevi0
ate the current fiscal crisis created by the passage of Proposition 13.23
The court held that the legislature permanently impaired the wage contracts between unions and local governments, and the fiscal crisis created
by Proposition 13 was an insufficient justification to warrant such a "se222. Id. at 232, 583 P.2d at 1291, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 249.
223. See supra notes 37-68, 126 and accompanying text.
224. See, e.g., ITT World Communications v. City & County of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 3d
859, 865, 693 P.2d 811, 816, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226, 231 (1985). The most fertile ground of
litigation-the meaning of the special taxes provision in section four-raises issues not relevant
to the analysis of this Article. For an analysis of these cases, see Henke & Woodleif, supra note
9; Kroll, CaliforniaCities v. Proposition 13, 3 CAL. LAW. 28 (June 1983).
225. 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).

226. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl.1; CAL. CONST. art. 1, § 16.
227. See supra text accompanying note 207 for the definition of home rule powers.
228. Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d at 302, 591 P.2d at 3, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 905.
229. Id. at 304, 591 P.2d at 4, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 906 (citing CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16281
(West 1980)).
230. Id.
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vere impairment" of contractual rights.23 1 The Legislature also violated
the home rule provisions of the California Constitution23 2 when it interfered with a municipal affair (compensation of employees) over which
chartered cities and counties have complete control even to the extent
that the provisions of charters prevail over general state law.2 33 On both
due process and equal protection grounds, the court extended the home
rule protections to general law cities and counties that did not generally
enjoy the same constitutional autonomy as chartered local
governments.23 4
In Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan,2 35 the California Supreme
Court considered whether the real property tax rate and, valuation limitations mandated by Proposition 13 applied to the taxation of the unsecured portion of the assessment roll for FY 1978-79.236 The issue
involved the relation between Proposition 13 and two other provisions of
the California Constitution: 237 (1) article XIII, section 2, which states
that personal property cannot be taxed at a higher rate than real property;238 and, (2) article XIII, section 12, which requires that taxes on
personal property and possessory interests be levied at the prior year's
tax rate for secured property.23 9 The court reasoned that the 1% limit
did not apply to the taxation of unsecured property for FY 1978-79; unsecured property would be taxed at the rate levied on secured property
during FY 1977-78.2 ° The court reasoned that, otherwise, Proposition
13 would have implicitly repealed article XIII, section 12.241 The court
also noted that Proposition 13 did not necessarily imply a conffict with
the requirement that unsecured property be taxed at the same rate as
secured property. 242
In State Board of Equalization v. Board of Supervisors,24 3 the California Court of Appeal held that Proposition 13 had not repealed article
XIII, section 1, which requires uniform rates and assessments. 2' The
231.
232.
233.
234.

Id. at 309-12, 591 P.2d at 7-9, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 909-11.
CAL. CONST. art. XI, §§ 3-6.
Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d at 315-18, 591 P.2d at 12-13, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 914-15.
Id. at 319, 591 P.2d at 14, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 916.

235. 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 918

(1981).
236. Id. at 858, 616 P.2d at 803, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 821.
237. Id. at 859, 616 P.2d at 804, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 822.
238. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 2.

239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.

Id. § 12.
Lonegran, 27 Cal. 3d at 868-69, 616 P.2d at 809-10, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 827-28.
Id. at 868, 616 P.2d at 809, 167 Cal. Rptr. at 827.
Id.
105 Cal. App. 3d 813, 164 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1980).
Id. at 822, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 744-45.
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court, therefore, invalidated a post-Proposition 13 assessment rule issued
by the State Board of Equalization.2 4 5 The Board of Equalization's rule
had stated that an assessment of a property could not be reduced below
its base period assessment, even if the true market value of that property
had declined, until that property was subsequently sold.24 6 The Board of
Equalization defended its rule by arguing that section 2 of article XIIIA
had severed that relation between assessed value and market value.2 47
The appellate court rejected the board's argument. 248 The court held
that Proposition 13 did not repeal, either expressly or by implication,
article XIII, section 1 of the California Constitution, requiring property
to be taxed in accordance
with its "fair market value. '2 49 Proposition 13
a
had simply redefined the meaning of "fair market value."' 25 ° While section 2 of article XIIIA placed a ceiling on the growth of assessed valuation, it did not create a floor.25 ' Therefore, assessments must be reduced
to reflect declines in market value even before properties are sold.25 2 The
court observed, "Article XIII, section 1, and 129 years of historical constitutional principle were left unchanged by the express language of
'13'.''253 The court also dismissed the notion that article XIII, section 1
had been repealed by implication.2 5 4
In Carmon v. Alvord,2 55 the California Supreme Court interpreted
Proposition 13 to avoid conflict with the Contracts Clause of the United
States Constitution and the California Constitution. 2 56 The issue was
whether the exemption of property taxes for the payment of voter-approved debt included voter-approved pension plans.257 The court held
245. Id. at 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
246. Id. at 817, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 741. The board reasoned that the constitutional amendment approved by the voters on November 8, 1978, requiring reduced assessments to reflect
declines in market value, applied prospectively, but not for FY 1978-79. Board ofEqual., 105
Cal. App. 3d at 817, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 741; see CAL. CONsT. art. XIIIA.
247. Id. at 818, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 742.
248. Id. at 820, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 743.
249. Id. at 822, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 744-45.
250. Id. at 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
251. .d. The court noted that "[a] complete reading of the voters pamphlet fails to reveal
how the electorate intended to relinquish the established constitutional guaranty providing for
taxation on fair market value. They merely voted to limit the increase in the value under
certain stated circumstances." Id. at 821-22, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 744.
252. Id. at 825, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
253. Id. at 822, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 744 (emphasis in original).
254. Id. The court also held that the board's interpretation of Proposition 13 would have
been unconstitutional even if voters had not passed the clarifying amendment in November
1978. Id. at 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
255. 31 Cal. 3d 318, 644 P.2d 192, 182 Cal. Rptr. 506 (1982).
256. Id. at 333, 644 P.2d at 514, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 200.
257. Id. at 322, 644 P.2d at 508, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 194.
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that the debt exemption included pension plans approved prior to Propo258
sition 13, thereby avoiding a constitutional conflict.
In ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San
Francisco,25 9 the California Supreme Court considered whether the assessment provisions of Proposition 13 applied to public utilities.26 ° Since
the 1930s, the State Board of Equalization had assessed utilities as unit
property and allocated that assessed value among local jurisdictions
which then taxed that property at the same rate as locally assessed property.261 The court held that Proposition 13 only applied to locally assessed, and not state-assessed, property.2 62 It reasoned that the
assessment limitations in article XIIIA, section 2, which effectively prevented annual reassessments, would have otherwise conflicted with the
provisions of article XIII, section 19, which requires annual assessment
of public utilities.2 63 The court observed:
So strong is the presumption against implied repeal that when a
new enactment conflicts with an existing provision, in order for
the second law to repeal or supercede the first, the former must
constitute a revision of the entire subject, so that the court may
say that it was intended to be a substitute for the first.2 6
The court harmonized the otherwise conflicting sections of the California
Constitution by noting that section 2(a) of Proposition 13 only mentioned county-assessed property, not state-assessed property, while article XIII, section 19 only required that state-assessed property be taxed at
the same rate as locally assessed property.2 65 The court reconciled its
258. Id. at 333, 644 P.2d at 514, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 200. Between FY 1978-79 and FY 198283, the implementation of Proposition 13 had treated taxes levied for voter-approved pension
plans as part of historical property tax revenues. See CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 97.4 (West
1987); see also Patton v. City of Alameda, 40 Cal. 3d 41, 44, 706 P.2d 1135, 1136-37, 219 Cal.
Rptr. 1, 3 (1985). Since those taxes were now exempt from the limit, Carmon, 31 Cal. 3d at
322, 644 P.2d at 192, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 506, they should have been excluded from the statutory
definition of the historical base. This would have required the statewide reallocation of approximately $1.04 billion of the revenues raised under the 1% tax limit. In response to the
decision, the legislature enacted AB 377, which deferred any financial effects from the ruling,
and forgave all potential liability for the repayment of improperly allocated property taxes.
Act effective July 28, 1983, ch. 491, §§ 2, 5, 1983 Cal. Stat. 1994-95 (codified as amended at
CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 97.4-97.6 (West 1987)).

259. 37 Cal. 3d 859, 693 P.2d 811, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1985).
260. Id. at 862, 693 P.2d at 814, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
261. Id.
262. Id. at 866, 693 P.2d at 817, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 232.
263. Id., 210 Cal. Rptr. at 231. See CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 2; id. art. XIII, § 19.

264. IT7, 37 Cal. 3d at 866, 693 P.2d at 817, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 231-32 (quoting Board of
Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 868, 616 P.2d 802, 810, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828
(1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981)).
265. Id. at 870, 693 P.2d at 820, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 235.
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holding with the Legislative Counsel opinion that Proposition 13's 1%
limit applied to state-assessed property.2 6 6 The court noted that its analysis agreed with the Counsel's view that section l(a) applied to stateassessed property, and the Legislative Counsel had not stated that section
2 67
2(a) of Proposition 13 applied to state-assessed property.
The narrow construction of Proposition 13 has been followed in
other cases. Though special assessments are levied on real property, they
have been held outside the 1% limit.26 8 Special assessments have also
been held exempt from the limitations imposed by article XIIIA, section
4.269 This treatment of special assessments illustrates how California
courts have consistently avoided reading destruction and annulment of
local fiscal powers as the intent or a necessary consequence of voter approval of Proposition 13.
To date, only one decision has expressly addressed challenges to the
constitutionality of the apportionment of property taxes. In Marin Hospital District v. Rothman,27 ' a California appellate court rejected challenges based on a violation of equal protection and impairment of vested
tax powers.27 1 In the case, the Matin Hospital District received no property tax revenues because it did not collect property taxes during FY
1977-78.272 The court held that the "state's local agencies' shortage of
funds" provided a sufficiently rational basis for the apportionment of
property taxes to satisfy equal protection under the United States Constitution and the California Constitution. 2 " It also dismissed the claim of
impairment of vested tax powers, observing that "local public agencies
have no vested right to impose taxes or otherwise to exercise any particu'274
lar governmental function.
C. The Lessons
Case law has established three themes for interpreting the intent and
consequences of Proposition 13: (1) Proposition 13 should be viewed as a
266. Id. at 868, 693 P.2d at 819, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 233. For a discussion and analysis of the
opinion by the Legislative Counsel, see supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
267. IT, 37 Cal. 3d at 868-69, 693 P.2d at 818-19, 210 Cal. Rptr. at 233-34.
268. Solvang Mun. Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 557,
169 Cal. Rptr. 391, 398 (1980).
269. County of Fresno v. Malstrom, 94 Cal. App. 3d 974, 985-86, 156 Cal. Rptr. 777, 784
(1979).
270. 139 Cal. App. 3d 495, 188 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1983).
271. Id. at 501-02, 188 Cal. Rptr at 832.
272. Id. at 497, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 829.
273. Rothman, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 501, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
274. Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). For a critical analysis of this conclusion, see infra notes 574-85 and accompanying text.
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local property tax limitation, not a major revision of the nature of local
government in California;27 5 (2) it should be construed in ways to avoid
conflict with other constitutional provisions;2 76 and, (3) it should be con-

strued narrowly in regard to limiting the home rule powers of local governments, including their power over fiscal affairs.2 77
While a state appellate court has upheld the constitutionality of the
apportionment of property tax revenues,2 7 8 it should not be concluded
that implementation legislation is beyond further scrutiny. In Amador
Valley Joint Union High School Districtv. State Board of Equalization,279
the California Supreme Court stressed that it only responded to the is-

sues raised by the petitioners, and expressly left for future litigation other
challenges to Proposition 13 or its implementing legislation. 280 This Article responds to the court's invitation by extending the analysis of appor-

tionment of property taxes after Proposition 13 to include issues not
considered in prior cases or commentaries.
IV.

CALIFORNIA'S FISCAL CONSTITUTION

California's legal traditions do not support the view that the plenary
power of the state legislature leaves local governments with few, if any,
independent fiscal powers. Local governments find their power to tax
property in the California Constitution, not from the state legislature.

Local governments may provide and finance local services without undue
interference from the state legislature. A review of the economic principles, history, and case law of sections 14 and 24 of article XIII of the
California Constitution establishes that many constitutional provisions
must be satisfied by the apportionment of property taxes after Proposition 13.
275. See, e.g., Amador Valley Joint High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208,
583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1979).
276. ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 3d 859,
693 P.2d 811, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226 (1985); Carmon v. Alvord, 31 Cal. 3d 818, 644 P.2d 192, 182
Cal. Rptr. 506 (1982); Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 616 P.2d 802, 167
Cal. Rptr. 820 (1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981); Sonoma County Org. of Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979); State Bd. of
Equal. v. Board of Supervisors, 105 Cal. App. 3d 813, 164 Cal. Rptr. 739 (1980).
277. See, e.g., 17T, 37 Cal. 3d at 859, 693 P.2d at 811, 810 Cal. Rptr. at 226; Sonoma, 23
Cal. 3d at 296, 591 P.2d at 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. at 903; Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 208, 583 P.2d at
1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 239; Marin Hosp. Dist. v. Rothman, 139 Cal. App. 3d 495, 188 Cal.
Rptr. 828 (1983).
278. Matin Hosp. Dist., 139 Cal. App. 3d at 495, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 828.
279. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978).
280. Id. at 219-20, 583 P.2d at 1283-84, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 241-42.
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Economic Principles

Economic analysis supports granting local governments substantial
autonomy over the provision and the financing of public services.2 81
Governments may provide many alternative services: police and fire protection, education, social services, parks, street maintenance, traffic control, and different regulations. Public provision of those services may be
extensive or modest, supplied by government employees or contract suppliers, and financed by different combinations of taxes and user fees. If
local governments are granted independent fiscal powers, they can offer
different bundles of services, taxes, and fees. Individuals can select the
locality which offers, from their viewpoint, the best combination of government services for the taxes and user fees paid.
This "inter-jurisdictional competition" promotes many principles of
good government: individuals have greater freedom of choice than they
would under more centralized government; public decisionmaking is held
accountable through competition for industry and households; and, individuals who benefit from government programs are held responsible for
282
paying the costs.
Voter-approved tax limitations address potential impediments to inter-jurisdictional competition. The effectiveness of competition may be
inhibited by moving costs and the presence of non-government, locational advantages of land. In these situations, local governments may
spend and tax excessively without risking a significant loss of economic
activity.283 Tax limitations prevent local governments from exploiting
these rigidities. 284 This view explains the focus of Proposition 13: limit
local taxation of the most immobile of all assets-property, prohibit the
imposition of new property taxes, and make local governments seek direct voter approval for levying special taxes to support the expansion of
local government spending.
B.

The Fallof Dillon's Rule

On the surface, the plenary power of state government contradicts
281. For the classic statement, see Tiebout, A Pure Theory ofLocal Expenditures,64 J. POL.
ECON. 416 (1956). For an account of the economic implications for the division of powers
within a federal system of government, see R. WAGNER, THE FISCAL ORGANIZATION OF
AMERICAN FEDERALISM (1971); THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FISCAL FEDERALISM (W.

Oates ed. 1977) [hereinafter FISCAL FEDERALISM]. For an extensive analysis of the economic
implications for constitutions, see G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, THE POWER TO TAX: ANALYTICAL FOUNDATIONS OF A FISCAL CONSTITUTION

(1980).

282. See FISCAL FEDERALISM, supra note 281 at 5-12.
283. See G. BRENNAN & J. BUCHANAN, supra note 281, at 173-78.

284. Id. at 197-201.
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the economic principles of local autonomy. State legislatures have wide
discretion in designing statutes concerning local government powers, except as limited by the state constitution. 8 5 This plenary power is exemplified by Dillon's Rule, which states that local governments have only
those powers expressly granted, those necessarily or fairly implied as incidental to those powers expressly granted, and those that are essential
and indispensable to the declared purposes of the municipality. 286 Historically, this rule has been interpreted as stating that local governments
possess few independent powers; their powers only originate from statutes enacted by state legislatures.2 8 7
In California, the plenary power of the Legislature has been severely
limited by constitutional restrictions. Local governments have independent, constitutionally protected fiscal powers.2 88 The limitations did not
originate from abstract reasoning but from bitter experience applying an
extreme form of Dillon's Rule in the mid-19th century.
1. The 1849 Constitution: the era of unbridled state plenary powers
When California's first constitution was drafted in 1849, it embodied
an extreme form of Dillon's Rule. Local self-government was not viewed
as important or desirable because the drafters trusted local government
less than state government.2 8 9 As a result, they made it the "duty" of the
legislature to restrict the power of cities to tax, borrow, and conduct
business, "so as to prevent abuses in assessments and contracting debts"
by local governments. 290 Local governments enjoyed few powers independent of those granted by the Legislature. 9 I
A flood of special legislation imposing obligations on local governments and overriding local decisions followed the adoption of Dillon's
Rule. Cities became obligated, among other things, to pay claims to designated individuals, and to issue bonds and to levy taxes for purposes
285. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
286. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 25, § 49, at 137. Dillon's Rule was first proposed by Judge
John F. Dillon. J. DILLON, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 55 (1st ed. 1872).
Although critics have charged that the authorities cited by Dillon do not support his rule, it is
often cited even where it is no longer strictly applied. 0. REYNOLDS supra note 25, § 49, at
137.
287. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 25, § 49, at 138.

288. Id. at 135-37.
289. See Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California I, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 7 (1941)
[hereinafter Home Rule I].
290. Id. (citing J. BROWNE, REPORT OF THE DEBATES IN THE CONVENTION OF CALIFORNIA ON THE FORMATION OF THE STATE CONSTITUTION IN SEPTEMBER AND OCTOBER, 1849
126-28, 136 (1850)); see also CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 37 (1849, repealed 1879).
291. Home Rule I, supra note 289, at 23.
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specified by the Legislature.2 92 The Legislature validated ordinances,
earlier held illegal under local law, and mandated local projects and local
policies even though these policies conflicted with the preferences of local
residents and locally elected officials.2 93 On the basis of Dillon's Rule,
early California case law upheld these actions against legal challenges.2 94
Despite these early court victories, the prominence of Dillon's Rule
for California law was decreasing by the 1870s. In People v. Lynch,2 95
decided in 1875, the California Supreme Court held unconstitutional a
legislative act that had instructed the City of Sacramento to improve its
streets and to assess taxes for paying the cost of the project.2 96 The court
cited violations of the state constitution, which it reconstrued to protect
local autonomy in fiscal affairs, including the inherent right of local selfgovernment.2 97 At the time of drafting California's second Constitution
in 1879, "the supreme court had completely abandoned the doctrine of
absolute legislative supremacy over municipal corporations .....298
2.

The 1879 Constitution: the emergence of local autonomy

The adoption of the 1879 Constitution quickly overshadowed the
evolving case law. Five new sections were adopted limiting the power of
the Legislature to interfere with the affairs of municipal corporations,
and all have survived to this day: (1) article IV, section 25, prohibiting
special legislation and providing for incorporation of cities under general
law;2 99 (2) article XI, section 8, giving any city the power to have a charter for its own government;" °° (3) article XI, section 11, vesting in cities
the power to make and enforce within the limits of their jurisdictions all
local, police, sanitary, and other regulations that do not conflict with
general law;30 1 (4) article XI, section 12, taking from the Legislature the
power to impose taxes on cities or their inhabitants or property, for city
or municipal purposes; 3 2 and, (5) article XI, section 13, prohibiting the
Legislature from delegating to any special commission, private corporation, company, association, or individual any power to make, control,
292. Id. at 11-14.
293. Id. at 11, 15-19.
294. See, eg., People ex rel Blunding v. Burr, 13 Cal. 343 (1859) (upholding state law requiring San Francisco commissioner to issue bonds to pay debt).
295. 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
296. Id. at 16-17.
297. Id. at 31.
298. Home Rule I, supra note 289, at 34.
299. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 25 (1879) (current version at art. XI, § 2).
300. Id. art. XI, § 3.
301. Id. art. XI, § 7.
302. Id. art. XI, § 12 (current version at art. XIII, § 24).
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appropriate, supervise, or in any way interfere with any county, city, or

municipal improvement, including the levying of taxes or assessments, or
30 3

performance of municipal functions.
Still, not all of these sections significantly protected the autonomy of
local government. The provision against special legislation and general

laws for organization did not result in a substantial grant of home rule.3

4

While the third provision was once "widely heralded as a salutary provision guaranteeing home rule, ' 30 5 such claims have subsequently been
held "largely spurious. ' 30 6 Additionally, the fifth provision has been
generally ineffective and its repeal has been suggested.30 7 Only the fourth
30 8
provision has promoted local autonomy.

The California Constitution's rejection of Dillon's Rule warrants
scrutiny. As Professor Cohn has concluded, "California stands alone,
among home rule states, in the scope of revenue autonomy enjoyed by its
cities ...includ[ing] the power of local taxation, a heartening rejection of
the almost universal rule that municipalities have no inherent power of
taxation. ' 30 9 The high degree of local autonomy originates from sections
3 10
14 and 24 of article XIII.

C. Local Government Power to Tax Property.

Local governments derive their power to tax property from the California Constitution. Unless expressly exempted by the California Constitution or the laws of the United States, all property is taxable. 3 11 This

power to tax property is self-executing; statutory authority is not

needed.312 Even though most discussions of home rule ignore the tax
303. Id. art. XI, § 11.
304. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in California II, 30 CALIF. L. Rnv. 272, 327 (1942)
[hereinafter Home Rule I1].
305. Peppin, MunicipalHome Rule in CaliforniaIII Section 11 ofArticle XI of the California Constitution, 32 CALIF. L. REv. 341, 391 (1944) [hereinafter Home Rule 111].
306. Id. This assessment is particularly ironic because it was the modern day version of this
section that was the focus of debate in Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist v. State
Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 224-27, 583 P.2d 1-281, 1287-88, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 245-46
(1978); see supra notes 183-216 and accompanying text for a discussion of Amador.
307. Peppin, Municipal Home Rule in CaliforniaIV, 34 CALIF. L. REV. 644, 694 (1946)
[hereinafter Home Rule IF].
308. Id. at 676.
309. Cohn, MunicipalRevenue Powers in the Context of ConstitutionalHome Rule, 51 Nw.
U.L. REv. 27, 41 (1956) (footnote omitted).
310. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 14, 24. Neither of these sections were considered by the
California Supreme Court in Amador. 22 Cal. 3d 308, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239.
311. CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1.
312. Bauer-Schweitzer Malting Co. v. City and County of San Francisco, 8 Cal. 3d 942,
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situs provision of the California Constitution,3 13 its history has established the division of property tax powers between state and local
governments. 14
The tax situs provision states that "[a]ll property . . . shall be assessed in the county, city ... or district in which it is situated. 315 Constitutional history and case law establish that tax situs recognizes the
power of local governments to tax real, personal, and state-assessed property.3 16 In addition, it conforms with the rule that "the basic limit on
municipal use of the property tax is teritoriality-i.e. a local government
can only tax property within its boundaries. "317

1. Constitutional history
Tax situs dates from the 1849 Constitution when landowners in
southern California demanded its inclusion to restrain the property tax
powers of state government.3 1 Those landowners feared that, without
the restriction, politically powerful interests in northern California would

tax their property to finance out-of-county expenditures.31 9 Under the
1849
state
local
local

Constitution, the legislature imposed a general property tax for
purposes, and local governments levied their own property tax for
purposes. 320 County officials assessed property for both state and
property taxation.3 21 Their assessment practices became the source

of substantial political conflict about whether property was uniformly assessed statewide.32 2 The primary concern was that local assessors under-

assessed property to reduce the state property tax burden paid by local
946, 506 P.2d 1019, 1021, 106 Cal. Rptr. 643, 645 (1973); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. County of
Santa Clara, 50 Cal. App. 3d 74, 81, 123 Cal. Rptr. 195, 199 (1975).
313. See, e.g., E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, §§ 3.00-.40, at 3-5 to 3-21; see also CAL.
CONsT. art. XIII, § 14.
314. E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, § 3.08, at 3-27.
315. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
316. E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, § 44.87, at 303, § 44.07, at 26-27; Cohn, supra note 309,
at 42-43.
317. 0. REYNOLDS, supra note 25, § 96, at 293 (emphasis added and footnote omitted); see
also E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, § 44.86, at 302 (while property within city can be taxed for
city purposes, no authority exists to levy tax on properties situated beyond corporate limits);
id. § 44.87, at 303 (place where property is taxable is generally place where property is situated, irrespective of residence of owner); 4 C. SANDS & M. LIBONTI, LOCAL GOVERNMENT
LAW § 23.09, at 23-24 (1982) (local governments cannot tax real property beyond boundaries
of municipality absent express grant of extra territorial taxing power).
318. J. GOULD, THE CALIFORNIA TAX SYSTEM: CALIFORNIA REVENUE AND TAXATION
CODE (SECTIONS 1 TO 6000) 8 (West 1956).
319. Id.
320. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 13 (1849, repealed 1879).
321. J. GOULD, supra note 318, at 10-11.
322. Id.
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residents. 323
Despite this dispute, tax situs effectively restrained the power of the
legislature to dictate local property tax policy. 324 Moreover, one year
before the California Supreme Court decided People v. Lynch,32 5 the
court declared unconstitutional a statute which had authorized the State
Board of Equalization to alter locally assessed property values.32 6 The
court's reasoning was that the statute had implicitly vested a tax power
in a state government agency which tax situs had vested in local assessors.327 Tax situs protected local government property tax powers.3 28
Disputes over assessment practices continued for the next thirty
years. A 1905 commission on revenue and taxation concluded that the
general property tax system in California was antiquated.32 9 The incentives for local assessors to understate property values had made a mockery of state fiscal arrangements. 330 To solve the problem, the
Commission recommended a "Separations Agreement," which contained
three features: (1) the general property tax is abandoned as a source of
revenue for state government; (2) counties and cities have a generally
exclusive right to impose property taxes for local purposes; and, (3) state
government generally has an exclusive right to derive revenue from corporate franchises, banks, public utilities, railroads and the like.33 1 In
1910, California voters approved two constitutional amendments which
effectively implemented the Separations Agreement.3 3 2 Article XIII, section 10 stated, "All property, except as otherwise in this Constitution
provided, shall be assessed in the county, city, city and county, town or
township, or district in which it is situated, in the manner prescribed by
law."'3 33 In the same election, the voters also approved article XIII, section 14, which gave state government the exclusive power to tax the enti323. Id. at 12.
324. See generally,Home Rule I, supranote 289; Home Rule 11, supra note 304; Home Rule
III, supra note 305; Home Rule IV, supra note 307. No instance of state interference with
local property taxation is contained in Peppin's extensive recitation of successful intrusion by
the legislature into local affairs during the heyday of Dillon's Rule in California.
325. 51 Cal. 15 (1875).
326. Houghton v. Austin, 47 Cal. 646 (1874).

327. Lynch, 51 Cal. at 23-24; see also Houghton, 47 Cal. at 664-65 (right to fix tax rates
cannot be delegated to State Board of Equalization); J. GOULD, supra note 318, at 13.
328. Lynch, 51 Cal. at 24; Houghton, 47 Cal. at 660.
329. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON REVENUE AND TAXATION (1906) reprinted in 2
(1907).
330. J. GOULD, supra note 318, at 18-19.
331. Id. at 19.
332. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 10 (1910) (current version at art. XIII, § 14).
333. Id.
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ties mentioned in the third part of the Separations Agreement. 334 This
was achieved through a gross receipts tax.33 5
For almost a quarter of a century, the state abandoned the entire
field of property taxation, including the valuation of properties for the
purpose of establishing assessed values.3 36 In 1933, the legislature approved the Riley-Stewart Plan,3 37 which abandoned the Separations
Agreement.33 8 Public utilities, exempted from property taxation by the
original Separations Agreement, now became subject to property taxa39
tion to the same extent and in the same manner as other property.
The State Board of Equalization would now assess public utilities as
state-assessed properties. 34 The Board then transmits to local taxing jurisdictions an assessment roll showing the value of public utility property
located within their jurisdiction.341 Utility property so assessed was subject to taxation locally at the rates fixed for taxation of property in the
342
respective taxing jurisdictions.
The wording of the tax situs provision of the California Constitution
was unchanged until the 1974 election when voters approved the current
version.3 43 The 1974 amendment dropped two clauses: "except as otherwise in this Constitution provided," and "in the manner prescribed by
law.",3 " The Attorney General's ballot summary of the 1974 amendment viewed the wording changes as minor, with no expressed or implied
intent to change the conduct of actual fiscal affairs in California.34 5
2.

Judicial interpretations

Courts have used tax situs to decide which local governments may
tax specific properties.34 6 The reasoning used in these cases illustrates
how the economic principles of fiscal autonomy have guided California
334. Id. § 14.
335. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (1910, repealed 1933).
336. J.GOULD, supra note 318, at 19.
337. Act effective May 6, 1933, ch. 63, 1933 Cal. Stat. 3072 (codified as amended at CAL.
CONsT. art. IV, § 34a (1954).
338. The Riley-Stewart Plan had many other provisions which are not germane to this
Article. See J.GOULD, supra note 318, at 31-32.
339. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (1919, amended 1933).
340. Bertane, The Assessment of Public Utility Property in California, 20 UCLA L. REV,
419, 424 (1973).
341. Id. at 425.
342. Id.
343. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14 (1910, amended 1974).
344. Id. (as amended 1974).
345. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET (June 1974).
346. See, e.g., San Francisco & San Joaquin Valley Ry. v. City of Stockton, 149 Cal. 83, 84
P. 771 (1906); Stockton Gas & Elec. v. San Joaquin Co., 148 Cal. 313, 83 P. 54 (1905); San
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courts for over a century. The disputes have involved the situs of per34 7
sonal property or state-assessed property for the purpose of taxation.
Shortly after the 1879 Constitution was adopted, the California
Supreme Court decided City of San Francisco v. Charles Lux Executors.3 48 The court used tax situs to determine which county could assess
the bank deposits of an estate located in San Mateo County after the
executor moved the funds to San Francisco County. 349 The court used
the decedent's place of residence, as opposed to place of the funds' deposit, to allow taxation by San Mateo County, thereby preventing taxation by San Francisco County.35 °
Twenty years later, in San Francisco & San Mateo Electric Railway
Co. v. Scott,35 1 the California Supreme Court addressed the issue of
whether street railroad property was properly assessed by the State
Board of Equalization or county governments.3 52 Under the California
Constitution at the time, local governments taxed locally assessed property within their jurisdictions and state-assessed property apportioned
among local jurisdictions on the basis of track mileage. 35 3 Therefore, locally assessed property was exclusively within the tax base of the local
governments where the property was situated. Whereas, state-assessed
property was included in the apportionment of all "unitary" property
among the tax bases of local governments throughout the state where the
railroad had trackage. 4
The issue confronted by the court was whether "railroads," as envisioned by the California Constitution, included "street railroads."3'5 5
Reasoning that street railroads were not railroads, the court concluded
that the property in question was locally assessed and, therefore, taxable
only by the local governments where the street railroads were situated.35 6
In a classic statement of the theory of tax situs, the court observed:
It is plainly the general policy of the law that property situated
Francisco & San Mateo Elec. Ry. Co. v. Scott, 142 Cal. 222, 75 P. 575 (1904); San Francisco v.
Charles Lux Executors, 64 Cal. 481, 2 P. 254 (1884).
347. See, e.g., Stockton, 149 Cal. at 83, 84 P. at 771; San Joaquin Co., 148 Cal. at 313, 83 P.
at 54; Scott, 142 Cal. at 222, 75 P. at 575; Charles Lux, 64 Cal. at 481, 2 P. at 254.
348. 64 Cal. 481, 2 P. 254 (1884).
349. Id. at 482, 485, 2 P. at 254, 256-57.
350. Id. at 485, 2 P. at 256.
351. 142 Cal. 222, 75 P. 575 (1904).
352. Id. at 223, 75 P. at 575.
353. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 10 (1879, repealed 1974); see.also Bertane, supra note 340, at
422.
354. Bertane, supra note 340, at 423.
355. Scott, 142 Cal. at 225, 75 P. at 580.
356. Id. at 228-29, 75 P. at 580-81.
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in one county or city should be taxable in that county or city
for local purposes ... and that local subdivision alone should
have the benefit of this value for the purpose of raising its revenue. This, indeed, is the basis of all local taxation•., the property which receives the benefit of local government shall pay its
proportion of the expenses thereof, apportioned according to
actual value. It would be a very anomalous condition of affairs,
therefore, if a franchise granted by one municipality, and entirely local to that municipality, should be assessed by a system
which would permit a part of its value to be taken from the
assessment of the municipality in which it is situated and trans-

ferred to another municipality

....

357

The California Supreme Court relied on this interpretation of tax
situs again in San Francisco & San Joaquin Valley Railway v. City of
Stockton,3 58 when it upheld Stockton's power to tax a local railway company.35 9 The court observed that unless explicitly enumerated in the
constitution, property "must be assessed by the assessor of the district
where situated, in the same manner as other property. ' ' 36° The court
reasoned:
[T]he only property in the state excepted from the local assessment required by the constitution is that portion of the property of railroads operated in more than one county.., and this
... is not an exception to the general policy that the localsubdivision wherein property is situated,shall have the benefit of the
value thereoffor the purpose of raisingits revenue. 6 1
This interpretation constrains the Legislature because it "could not," the
court noted, "make assessable by the state board that which the constitution required to be assessed locally. '362 The California Constitution determines the property to be taxed by local governments, not the state
legislature.3 63
The interpretation of tax situs used in the railway cases has also
357. Id. at 229, 75 P. at 581 (emphasis added).
358. 149 Cal. 83, 84 P. 771 (1906).
359. Id. at 88-89, 84 P. at 773-74.
360. Id. at 87, 84 P. at 773.
361. Id. at 89, 84 P. at 774 (emphasis added).
362. Id. at 88, 84 P. at 773.
363. Id. at 85-86, 84 P. at 772. This reasoning followed an earlier decision of the court, San
Francisco v. Central Pac. R.R., 63 Cal. 467 (1883), and a decision of the United States
Supreme Court, California v. Central Pac. R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888) (state law requiring steamers used by railroad companies to transport passengers to be state-assessed rather than locallyassessed held unconstitutional).
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been used to resolve other property tax disputes. In Stockton Gas &
the California Supreme Court considElectric Co. v. San Joaquin Co.,
ered which county could assess and tax the franchise held by Stockton
Gas.365 The company's operations were located in the City of Stockton,
but the company was incorporated in San Francisco.366 The court held
that "the franchise can be assessed for the purposes of taxation only in
the county where it is situated. '367 The court reasoned that tax situs
recognizes "one of the fundamental principles of taxation, that property
situated in a city and county should be taxed there for the purpose of
revenue; that the property which has had the protection and benefit of
municipal government shall pay its share of the expenses required to insure these advantages .... ,,68 Stockton Gas was to be taxed exclusively
by the City of Stockton, not San Francisco.3 6 9
In Temescal Water Co. v. Niemann, 7 ° an appellate court affirmed
the taxation of Temescal's property by the City of Elsinore, where the
property was located, against a claim that the company should be taxed
solely by Riverside County and the City of Corona, where the water
company operated.3 7 1 The court reasoned:
It is conceded, and indeed that matter is not subject of question, that a municipality has the right to assess all real property
found within its limits for the purpose of maintaining the municipal revenues, and that county taxing officials have the right
to levy upon the same property for county purposes.37 2
tax situs
In reaching its decision, the court relied on the explanation3 7 for
3
found in the California Supreme Court's decision in Scott.
Tax situs has also determined which local governments within a
county may tax property. In Kern Valley Water Co. v. County of
Kern,3 74 the plaintiff challenged the validity of its property tax obligation
364. 148 Cal. 313, 83 P. 54 (1905).
365. Id. at 316, 83 P. at 55.
366. Id. at 314, 83 P. at 54.
367. Id. at 322, 83 P. at 58.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 321-22, 83 P. at 57-58; see also Cox Cable San Diego, Inc. v. San Diego County,
158 Cal. App. 3d 368, 386, 229 Cal. Rptr. 839, 849-50 (1986) (relying on explanation of tax
situs in Stockton Gas to conclude that possessory interest of cable television company was
properly assessable by county assessor).
370. 22 Cal. App. 174, 133 P. 992 (1913).
371. Id. at 178-79, 133 P. at 994.
372. Id. at 176, 133 P. at 993.
373. Id. (citing San Francisco & San Mateo Ry. Co. v. Scott, 142 Cal. 222, 75 P. 575
(1904)); see supra notes 351-57 and accompanying text for a discussion of Scott.
374. 137 Cal. 511, 70 P. 476 (1902).
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because its tax bill did not show which school and road districts had
taxed its property. 375 The dispute arose because the water company had
canals and ditches that ran throughout the county and across the boundaries of many school and road districts.3 76 The California Supreme
Court held that the canals and ditches must be separately assessed by
each school and road district so that property taxes would be collected
only by the districts in which the property was situated. 7 The court
observed that "any other view would not be in harmony with the
378
constitution.
The California Supreme Court applied the same rule eleven years
later in Kern River Co. v. County of Los Angeles.379 The plaintiff was a
corporation engaged in the production and transmission of power from
its plant in Kern County to a transforming station located in the City of
Los Angeles, but owned by another corporation.3 80 The dispute concerned the method used by the Los Angeles County Assessor to apportion Kern River's property among school districts.3 81 The
apportionment formula created a tax obligation to the Delsur School
District, even though the plaintiff's lines did not extend over a public
right-of-way in that district. 38 2 The court held that the assessment
formula was not accurate enough for constitutional purposes because it
allocated monies to Delsur School District even though, under tax situs,
it was not entitled to any tax monies. 383 As with its decision in Kern
Valley Water,8 4 merely keeping monies in the "right county" did not
pass constitutional muster.
Tax situs has also been used to construe local assessment tax powers
broadly and state assessment powers narrowly. In Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe Railroad v. County of Los Angeles,3 85 the California Supreme
Court upheld local assessment of a portion of the railroad's property not
directly related to its right-of-way. 38 6 The plaintiff argued that this property should be state-assessed.3 87 The court disagreed, stating: "the ques375.
376.
377.
378.
379.
380.
381.
382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.

Id. at 515, 70 P. at 477.
Id.
Id. at 516, 70 P. at 477.
Id.
164 Cal. 751, 130 P. 714 (1913).
Id. at 753, 130 P. at 714.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 755, 130 P. at 715.
Kern Valley Water, 137 Cal. at 515, 70 P. at 477.
156 Cal. 437, 111 P. 250 (1910).
Id. at 441, 111 P. at 252.
Id. at 439, 111 P. at 251.
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tion as to which is the proper body or person to assess depends entirely
upon the language of the constitution; that the assessment by the [State]
[B]oard of [E]qualization is an exception to the general rule requiring all
property to be assessed locally."3'88 In- effect, local assessment is presumed unless the constitution expressly states otherwise.
In Story v. Richardson,3 89 the California Supreme Court again decided in favor of local taxation. The plaintiff owned an office building in
Los Angeles County.3 9 Boilers and other equipment in his building
were used to supply tenants with electricity and hot water.3 9 1 He also
sold power to tenants in an adjacent building. 92 The State Board of
Equalization levied a tax on the plaintiff and claimed jurisdiction under
then article XIII, section 14 of the state constitution, the provision empowering the Board to tax sales of electricity and steam.3 93 The plaintiff
argued that section 14 only gave the Board the power to tax companies
which operated as public utilities, and not to tax entities which supplied
services also provided by public utilities.3 94 The court agreed with the
plaintiff.395 Since his business was not a public utility, the court reasoned, the plaintiff's activities were outside the tax powers of the
Board.39 6 The court effectively applied a narrow definition of what constitutes a public utility. Accordingly, the court's holding is consistent
with the general rule in California-unless expressly stated otherwise in
the constitution, assessment and property tax powers are reserved to local governments.
More recently, in Zantop Air Transport,Inc. v. County of San Bernardino,3 9 7 an appellate court held that airplane property could be locally assessed for the purpose of local taxation.39 8 The court rejected the
argument that airplanes were exempt from taxation because they were
not mentioned in the California Constitution.39 9 The court stated that
"the fact that section 14, article XIII of the Constitution providing for
the centralized assessment of railroad, utility, and certain other types of
388. Id. at 441, 111 P. at 251 (emphasis added).
389. 186 Cal. 162, 198 P. 1057 (1921).
390. Id. at 163, 198 P. at 1058.
391. Id. at 163-64, 198 P. at 1058.
392. Id. at 164, 198 P. at 1058.
393. Id.; see CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 14.
394. Story, 186 Cal. at 165, 198 P. at 1059.
395. Id. at 166, 198 P. at 1060.
396. Id. at 166-67, 198 P. at 1060. The California Supreme Court applied identical reasoning 17 years later in Cadahy Packing Co. v. Johnson, 12 Cal. 2d 583, 86 P.2d 348 (1939).
397. 246 Cal. App. 2d 433, 54 Cal. Rptr. 813 (1966).
398. Id. at 438, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
399. Id. at 437, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
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property fails to include aircraft cannot be taken as an intention to exempt such property from taxation."'
Instead, the court applied the
theory of tax situs to allow local assessment and taxation of the airplanes." As in the earlier "private" utility cases," 2 the Zantop court
presumed local governments had the power to tax property unless the
4 3
California Constitution expressly stated otherwise. 0
In Smith-Rice Heavy Lifts, Inc. v. County of Los Angeles,4" an appellate court used tax situs to decide which county should tax barges
documented in San Francisco County but operated and permanently situated in Los Angeles County." In holding that the County of Los Angeles had the power to tax the barges, the court observed "[w]here
property is situated exclusively within one taxing authority, in this instance a county, article XIII, section 10 (tax situs), requires that it be
assessed only in that county from which it derives benefits and not in
another county from which it receives no benefits."'"' 6
D. Local Taxes for Local Purposes: Fiscal Home Rule
Most discussions of home rule also ignore article XIII, section 24,
even though, like tax situs, it establishes fiscal home rule powers of local
governments. The section now reads: "The Legislature may not impose
taxes for local purposes but may authorize local governments to impose
them."'"' 7 The amendment history and case law of this section indicate
that it has also restricted the plenary power of the legislature in regard to
the fiscal affairs of local governments.
This fiscal home rule provision -was originally added to the 1879
California Constitution as article XI, section 12. That section was part
of the repudiation of unbridled plenary power of the legislature over the
policies of local governments. 4°' As adopted in 1879, it stated:
The Legislature shall have no power to impose taxes upon
counties, cities, towns, or other public or municipal corporations, or upon the inhabitants or property thereof, for county,
city, town, or other municipal purposes, but may, by general
laws, vest in the corporate authorities thereof the power to as400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.

Id.

Id.
See, e.g., Story, 186 Cal. at 162, 198 P. at 1057.
Zantop, 246 Cal. App. 2d at 437, 54 Cal. Rptr. at 816.
256 Cal. App. 2d 190, 63 Cal. Rptr. 841 (1967).
Id. at 200-01, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48.
Id. at 200, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 847-48 (citing CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 10).

407. CAL. CONST. art. 13, § 24.

408. See supra notes 299-308 and accompanying text.
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sess and collect taxes for such purposes. 4°9
Compared to tax situs, the amendment history for fiscal home rule is
uneventful. Within the past two decades, its language has been shortened without any obvious intent to change its meaning. Its place in the
California Constitution was transferred from article XI, section 12,
where it appeared with other home rule sections, to article XIII, section
24, joining the other sections on taxation. Fiscal home rule has been
consistently interpreted as protecting autonomy in local fiscal affairs.
When combined with the other home rule provisions considered by the
California Supreme Court in Amador Valley Joint Union High School
District v. State Board of Equalization,41° section 24 suggests that a "reverse Dillon's Rule" applies for taxation by chartered counties and cities.
1. Fiscal home rule for all local governments
Case law has resolved many controversies surrounding the interpretation of fiscal home rule. Cases have defined what it means for the Legislature to impose, rather than simply authorize, a local tax.4 11 Cases
have also defined what constitutes a municipal purpose.4 12 Furthermore,
case law has decided the extent to which local authorities are vested with
the power to tax.41 3
In People v. Martin,4 14 the California Supreme Court considered the
implications of the recently adopted article XI, section 12. The case involved a state statute enacted before the 1879 Constitution was adopted,
which provided for a license tax on businesses and occupations to be
collected by the tax collector of each county, who was obligated to place
the proceeds of the tax in the county's general fund.4 15 The court held
409. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 12 (1879, amended 1933).
410. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 583 P.2d 1281, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239 (1978). See supra notes 190-223 and
accompanying text for a discussion of Amador.
411. See McCabe v. Carpenter, 102 Cal. 469, 36 P. 836 (1897) (procedure mandating how
locdl authorities compute tax resulted in imposition of tax by Legislature rather than local
authorities).
412. See San Francisco v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 74 Cal. 113, 15 P. 380
(1887) (tax levied for firefighters relief fund constituted municipal purpose where fire departments are subject to local control). .
413. See West Coast Advertising Co. v. City & County of San Francisco, 14 Cal. 2d 516,
522, 95 P.2d 138, 142 (1939) ("[Any] power not expressly forbidden may be exercised by the
municipality, and any limitations upon its exercise are those only which have been specified in
the charter."); People v. Martin, 60 Cal. 153 (1882) (state constitution vests power to tax for
local purpose exclusively in local authorities).
414. 60 Cal. 153 (1882).
415. CAL. POLITICAL CODE § 3360, repealed by Act of May 16, 1939, ch. 154, 1939 Cal.
Stat. 1274.
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the statute unconstitutional.4 1 6 It observed that section 12 took "the
power to impose such taxes from the Legislature and vest[ed] it in the
local authorities, [and] is but another of the many evidences to be found
in the new [1879] Constitution of the intention to bring matters of local
concern home to the people."4' 17 Notwithstanding the common belief
that county governments are political subdivisions of the state with no
vested powers, and thereby under the sole control of the Legislature, this
decision established that fiscal home rule applied to county governments.
The Martin holding was sensible because counties were expressly mentioned in section 12.
The California Supreme Court applied the same rule five years later
in San Franciscov. Liverpool & London & Globe Insurance Co.4 18 The
state statute under review required agents of foreign insurance companies
to pay county treasurers a portion of the premiums issued within each
county.4 19 The statute further required that those funds be dedicated to
a county fireman fund.420 The court held the statute unconstitutional
because it was enacted for a municipal purpose. 4 21 The court reasoned
that "the purpose of [article XI, section 12] is to relegate to the local
boards the whole subject of county and municipal taxes for local purto impose any tax whatever
poses, and that the legislature has no power4 22
within those territories for local purposes.
The California Supreme Court has consistently applied article XI,
section 12 to protect the tax powers of county governments. In Fatjo v.
Pfister,42 3 the court held invalid a state statute which required placing the
revenues collected from court filing fees into the general fund of county
governments.4 2 4 The court held that the law violated article XI, section
12 by imposing a local tax for a local purpose.42 5
While case law established that section 12 prohibited the legislature
from imposing a local tax for local purposes, that section nevertheless
empowered the Legislature to authorize local governments to impose
their own taxes. What is the dividing line between imposing a tax, which
416.
417.
418.
419.

Martin, 60 Cal. at 155-56.
Id:at 156.
74 Cal. 113, 15 P. 380 (1887).
Id. at 117, 15 P. at 381.

420. Id.
421. Id. at 124, 15 P. at 384.
422. Id.
423. 117 Cal. 83, 48 P. 1012 (1897).
424. Act of Mar. 28, 1895, ch. 207, 1895 Cal. Stat. 267, repealed by Act of May 29, 1947,
ch. 424, 1947 Cal. Stat. 1039.
425. Fatyo, 117 Cal. at 86, 48 P. at 1013.

April 1990]

APPORTIONMENT OF PROPERTY TAXES

only local governments could do, and authorizing a tax, which the Legislature could do?
4 2 6 The case
The court provided the answer in McCabe v. Carpenter.
reviewed a state statute which involved taxes levied in counties and cities
but "estimated" by the county superintendent of schools.42 7 The court
held the statute unconstitutional because the cities and counties only performed a ministerial function.428 The court observed that "[i]f the legislature cannot impose a tax upon the property or inhabitants of a school
district, it would seem to follow, that it cannot prescribe a procedure
through which such tax would inevitably be levied without leaving some
discretion in regard to it to the local authorities."4'2 9 Therefore, the Legislature unconstitutionally imposes a tax if it leaves no discretion for local authorities to determine the magnitude of the tax. The court showed
concern with the substance of local control over taxation, not its form.4 30
To address what constitutes a municipal purpose, courts have applied reasoning that illustrates a close affinity between the theory of tax
situs and fiscal home rule. In Hughes v. Ewing,4 31 the court reviewed a
4 32
controversy over a voter-approved tax to build a new school house.
Before levying the approved tax and building the school house, the
school district changed its boundaries to exclude a portion of the people
who had voted for the new tax.43 3 The question was whether those people were still subject to the tax they had approved even though they lived
outside the district to be benefited by the new school house.4 34 Basing its
decision on article XI, section 12, the court held that they were not subject to the tax.4 35 It observed that "the property upon which the supervisors should have levied the tax is only such property as, at the time when
the tax is levied, was within the boundaries of this corporation. '436 The
court further stated that "it would be difficult, upon principle, to uphold
the validity of a tax upon property which is without the district to be
benefited by the expenditure of the money so to be raised. The theory
426. 102 Cal. 469, 36 P. 837 (1894).
427. Id. at 470, 36 P. at 837; see Act of Mar. 20, 1891, ch. 137, 1891 Cal. Stat. 182, repealed
by Act of Mar. 23, 1893, ch. 193, 1893 Cal. Stat. 236.
428. McCabe, 102 Cal. at 475-76, 36 P. at 838-39.
429. Id. at 471, 36 P. at 837.
430. See Home Rule IV, supra note 307, at 653 (citing McCabe v. Carpenter, 102 Cal. 469,
471, 36 P. 837,837 (1894)).
431. 93 Cal. 414, 28 P. 1067 (1892).
432. Id. at 417, 28 P. at 1067.
433. Id.
434. Id.
435. Id. at 419-20, 28 P. at 1068.
436. Id. at 419, 28 P. at 1068.
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upon which the power of taxation is authorized is the benefit to the taxpayer. ' 437 The court effectively defined a municipal purpose as one
which benefits the residents within the jurisdiction of the local
government.
The California Supreme Court applied the same theory half a century later in Rancho Santa Anita, Inc. v. City of Arcadia.4 31 The plaintiff
disputed the city's collection of taxes to finance bond interest and sinking
funds.4 39 The plaintiff asserted that the city should levy taxes each year
only to the extent necessary to cover that fiscal year's principal and interest obligations." 0 The court upheld the financial practice," 1 stating that
the issue was whether, under the meaning of section 12, the monies accumulated in the challenged sinking funds constituted a municipal purpose." 2 The use of the funds did constitute a municipal purpose because
443
it financed the provision of future services to the city's residents.
Whether funds are expended within the jurisdiction's boundaries determines what constitutes a municipal purpose.
While section 12 offers substantial fiscal home rule discretion to local governments, it is well established that it does not vest local governments with general tax powers. 4 The Legislature's authority to vest tax
powers in local governments must be derived from general laws."
While the Legislature is under no duty to vest any tax powers," 6 legislative authorization applies to local taxes other than property taxes, such
as license taxes and fees." 7 Local governments can find their property
tax powers under sections 1 and 14 of article XIII.
2.

Fiscal home rule for chartered cities and counties

It would be mistaken to conclude that chartered cities and counties
have no vested tax powers other than property taxation. Since 1896, the
California Constitution has exempted chartered cities and counties from
general state laws in the case of "municipal affairs."" Early cases held
437. Id.
438. 20 Cal. 2d. 319, 125 P.2d 475 (1942).

439. Id. at 324, 125 P.2d at 477.
440.
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.

Id. at 325, 125 P.2d at 478.
Id. at 326, 125 P.2d at 482.
Id. at 323, 125 P.2d at 477.
Id. at 326, 125 P.2d at 479.
See Home Rule IV,supra note 307, at 667-68.
Hughes v. Ewing, 93 Cal. 414, 418, 28 P. 1067, 1067 (1892).
Exparte Pfirrmann, 134 Cal. 143, 144, 66 P. 205, 206 (1901).
Id.

448. Sato, "MunicipalAffairs" in California, 60 CALIF. L. REv. 1055, 1056 (1972); see CAL.
CONsT. art. XI, § 6.
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that revenue powers are to be construed as protected municipal affairs. 4 9
Subsequent amendments, such as in 1914, have strengthened the independent powers granted chartered local governments. 450 As for property taxation in general, a reverse Dillon's Rule applies-chartered local
governments, not the legislature, enjoy plenary tax powers in municipal
affairs. Although this conclusion conflicts with the standard perception
that local governments enjoy little independent power, it has substantial
51
support from California case law.
In West Coast Advertising Co. v. City and County of San Francisco,452 the California Supreme Court overturned a lower court ruling
that had invalidated a license tax imposed by the City and County of San
Francisco.4 53 The issue was whether the city had the power to levy the

license tax, even though neither the city charter nor the Legislature had
explicitly empowered the city to impose the tax. 4 't The court concluded
that the city had the power.45 5 In response to the argument that the
absence of a charter provision made the local tax invalid, the court

stated:
a charter is no longer a grant of powers, but is rather an instrument which accepts the privilege granted by Constitution of

complete autonomous rule with respect to municipal affairs,
and which otherwise serves merely to specify the limitations
and restrictions upon the exercise of the powers so granted and
449. See, e.g., Exparte Braun, 141 Cal. 204, 210, 74 P. 780, 782 (1903) ("when the power to
impose taxes is conferred upon a municipality to enable it to raise money essential for the
purposes for which it was created, that power necessarily becomes a municipal affair.").
450. CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 5 (city empowered "to make and enforce all laws and regulations in respect to municipal affairs .... ").
451. See generally E. MCQUILLIN, supra note 26, § 44.10, at 35 (California Constitution
permits municipalities to frame and adopt their own charters to levy taxes without any delegation of power from Legislature); C. ANTIEAU, supra note 26, § 3.03, at 3-16 (California Constitution provides that city charter may permit exercise of all powers not expressly limited by
charter, state constitution or federal laws); id. § 3.06, at 3-24 ("California courts have continued to look upon home rule charters as limitations upon power, not as grants of power....
Where power over municipal affairs is involved, the old doctrine of strict construction of municipal power is completely inapplicable."); id. § 3.30, at 3-93 ("[w]hether a home rule city has
power to tax in [California] should depend upon the state constitution and municipal charter
or ordinances, rather than upon acts of the state legislature"); id. § 21.05, at 21-14 (constitutional home rule provisions in California are deemed directly conferred upon municipal corporations' power of taxation for municipal affairs and purposes); id. § 31A.00, at 31-A3
(chartered county governments in California enjoy same home rule powers as city governments); id. § 31A.06, at 31A-10 to -12 (California Legislature is forbidden to legislate with
respect to local municipal affairs in manners contrary to existing local law).
452. 14 Cal. 2d 516, 95 P.2d 138 (1939).
453. Id. at 526, 95 P.2d at 144.
454. Id. at 518, 95 P.2d at 140-41.
455. Id. at 522, 95 P.2d at 142.

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:829

accepted.45 6
In response to the theory that the tax was invalid because the Legislature
had not empowered the city to levy the tax, the court observed:
The power of cities.., to raise money by taxation for municipal purposes does not find its source in any grant by the Legislature. There is no enactment of the legislature purporting to
vest such authority in such cities. Such power has been directly
granted by the people of the state by the provisions of the state
Constitution.45 7
Similarly, in Franklin v. Peterson,45 an appellate court upheld a license tax levied by the City of Los Angeles. 45 9 The court noted that in
1914, the requirement that the state must specifically grant powers to a
municipality was eliminated. 46 0 The court's ruling indicated that taxation for municipal purposes was to be regarded as a municipal affair
whose power stemmed from the Constitution, not a statute.4 61
As the explicit language of the Constitution suggests, 4 62 the plenary
power of chartered local governments applies solely to municipal affairs. 463 The Legislature can preempt local policy in the arena of statewide affairs. In Agnew v. City of Los Angeles, 4 " the California Supreme
Court held that the state had occupied the field of licensing electrical
contractors.4 65 Therefore, a state statute could preempt a conflicting Los
Angeles ordinance without violating the inherent powers which Los Angeles enjoyed as a chartered city. 4 6 6 An appellate court followed this rule
in Century Plaza Hotel Co. v. City of Los Angeles,4 67 by holding that the
state had preempted alcohol beverage taxation when it discharged its
constitutional duty to regulate alcoholic beverages, and by its adoption of
468
the Bradley-Burns Uniform Sales and Use Tax Law.
The final exception to local plenary powers over municipal affairs
456. Id.
457. Id. at 524, 95 P.2d at 143-44.
458. 87 Cal. App. 2d 727, 197 P.2d 788 (1948).
459. Id. at 734, 197 P.2d at 792.

460. Id. at 732-33, 197 P.2d at 791.
461. Id.

The California Supreme Court has also used this theory. See Weekes v. City of

Oakland, 21 Cal. 3d 386, 579 P.2d 449, 146 Cal. Rptr. 558 (1978); Ainsworth v. Bryant, 34
Cal. 2d 465, 211 P.2d 564 (1949).
462. CAL. CONsT. art. XI, § 5.

463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

Id.
51 Cal. 2d 1, 330 P.2d 385 (1958).
Id. at 6, 330 P.2d at 388.
Id. at 7, 330 P.2d at 388.
7 Cal. App. 3d 616, 623-24, 87 Cal. Rptr. 166, 170-71 (1970).
Id. at 624, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 171.
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occurs if a local practice conflicts with the California Constitution. In
Todd Shipyards Corp. v. City of Los Angeles,4 69 an appellate court held
that the city had to pay interest on wrongfully collected back-taxes, even
though a local ordinance stated otherwise.4 7 While the court acknowledged the city's plenary powers over municipal affairs as a chartered city,
it noted that city policy conflicted with article XIII, section 32 of the
California Constitution.4 7 Despite their autonomy, chartered cities
could not adopt provisions or ordinances inconsistent with the California
Constitution.4 7 2
E. The Lessons for the Implementation of Proposition 13
California constitutional history and case law reject the view that
local governments possess few, if any, independent tax powers. California's fiscal constitution has embraced the economic principles of local
fiscal autonomy. Article XIII, section 1 bestows local governments with
the power to tax property. Tax situs requires that local governments
only collect property taxes from the properties within their jurisdictions.
The California Constitution also prohibits the legislature from levying
local taxes for local purposes. In striking a balance between the power of
local governments to tax property and the state legislature's power to
make policy, the fiscal constitution in California is closer to the reverse of
Dillon's Rule than it is to the standard perception that the Legislature
enjoys plenary powers over local governments. The remarkable feature
about the legislative implementation of Proposition 13 is that it apportioned property tax revenues without conforming with any of these fiscal
principles.

V.

THE EROSION OF THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION

Existing law violates tax situs and tax uniformity. Tax situs was
violated when SB 154 based the apportionment of property tax revenues
on historical collection of property taxes.4 73 Tax uniformity was violated
when AB 8 allocated the growth in property taxes on the basis of tax
allocations in prior fiscal years.4 74 Both violations significantly affect taxpayers, as illustrated by case studies of the apportionment of property
469. 130 Cal. App. 3d 222, 181 Cal. Rptr. 652 (1982).
470. Id. at 226-27, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 654-55.
471. Id. at 227, 181 Cal. Rptr. at 655.
472. Id.
473. The Tax Justice Act of 1977, ch. 292, §§ 26-28, 1978 Cal. Stat. 608-09 (codified as
amended at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE §§ 110-110.6 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990)).
474. Act effective July 24, 1979, ch. 282, § 1025, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1026 (codified at CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 95-100 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990)).

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 23:829

taxes in the counties of Los Angeles,47 5 which accounts for one-third of
California's taxable assessed valuation,4 76 and San Bernardino, the fastest

growing county in California. Existing law must be reformed because it
is at odds with the California Constitution.
A.

How Tax Situs Was Violated in FY 1978-79

The constitutional problems with existing law can be demonstrated
by comparing the distribution of property taxes before and after Proposi-

tion 13 in a hypothetical county. Imagine two property owners, Jones
and Smith, each of whom owns a house with a market value of $100,000,
and pre-Proposition 13 assessed valuations of $25,000. Jones and Smith
live in the same county, but in different cities, which are the only two
cities in the county. Jones and Smith are also the only residents in their
respective cities. They are served by school districts and special districts
477
which have boundaries coterminous with the cities.
Consider the allocation of property tax revenues before Proposition
13 in our hypothetical county. 4 78 Both Jones and Smith paid a 4% tax
475. See Constitutional Reform, supra note 118, at app. A.
476. Id. at 107-09.
477. The example uses simplifying assumptions, although the conclusion would be equally
valid if complicating factors were considered. While the analysis becomes more complex if
school districts and special districts do not have coterminous boundaries with cities, the conclusion about the unconstitutionality of existing law remains intact. See Constitutional Reform, supra note 118, at 71-72. The analysis ignores other local taxes, fees, and grants from
higher levels of government because they are not relevant to an analysis of the property tax
provisions of the California Constitution. The analysis also ignores any rollback in assessed
valuation after Proposition 13, because the issues involve the apportionment of property taxes,
not the total amount of taxes to be apportioned. The analysis also ignores pre-Proposition 13
debt levies because debt levies are exempt from the tax limit. Id. at 72. Neither does it consider the allocation of state bail-out funds because the state enjoys discretion over how it allocates state monies for local purposes. Id.
Section 24 of Article XIII of the California Constitution allows the Legislature to appropriate state funds for local purposes. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24. Therefore, any differential
treatment of local governments in the allocation of such funds are within the discretionary
powers of the Legislature. The California Supreme Court made this distinction when it observed that the allocation of state bail-out monies raises fewer constitutional issues than the
allocation of property tax revenues. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State
Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208, 227, 583 P.2d 1281, 1288, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 246 (1978). The
state, of course, may not use its constitutional authority to obtain unconstitutional results.
Sonoma County Org. Pub. Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 305, 591 P.2d 1,
5, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903, 907 (1979).
478. See infra Appendix, Table 1. Before Proposition 13, tax situs and tax uniformity were
the pillars of property taxation. Each local government decided its property tax rate, subject
to a statutory maximum. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2261 (repealed 1978). Governments
submitted these rates to the county auditor who then computed the total property tax levied on
each property in the county. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 26912 (amended 1978). The county tax
collector collected the property tax and remitted the proceeds to local governments in accord-
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rate to county government ($1,000 annually). In addition, Jones paid a
2.56% rate to her city ($640 annually), a 2.24% rate to her schools ($560
annually), and a 0.20% rate to her special districts ($50 annually). The
revenues collected from Jones were received by Jones' local governments.
Smith paid lower property taxes. She paid a 0.64% rate to her city ($160
annually), a 1.76% rate to her schools ($440 annually), and a 0.60% rate
to her special districts ($150 annually). The revenues collected from
Smith were received by Smith's local governments.
Since Proposition 13, countywide property tax revenues have been
apportioned on the basis of historical collections. 4 79 The county auditor
has divided countywide property tax revenues among local agencies
(county, cities, and special districts) and school entities (schools). In this
example, local agencies received 75% of the $2,000 of countywide revenues and schools 25% because these were the respective shares of
countywide property taxes before Proposition 13. The auditor then apportioned the local agency and school entity pools. Assuming that the
pre-Proposition 13 data in the Table were also the average of the three
fiscal years prior to Proposition 13, the second stage allocation yields the
apportionment listed in the bottom panel. If county government received a uniform effective tax allocation rate (the ratio of its tax allocation to its assessed valuation) from each taxpayer, the county received an
equal contribution from Jones and Smith because both taxpayers had
identical assessed valuations.48 0
Note how property tax revenues have been redistributed. Jones pays
$1,000 in property taxes, but her local governments receive $1,125. In
effect, Proposition 13 cut property tax revenues collected by Jones' local
governments by less than it cut her property tax payments. This is because Smith's local governments collect only $875, even though Smith
ance with the tax rates stated on taxpayer bills. Id. Therefore, taxpayers only paid the tax
rates levied by the local governments that served them. Local governments, in turn, received
property taxes only from properties within their jurisdictional boundaries. The assessment of
property taxes therefore satisfied tax situs. Moreover, taxpayers paid uniform tax rates, in that
each local government levied a uniform tax rate. Procedures for property taxation thus also
satisfied the tax uniformity requirement of the California Constitution. CAL. CONsT. art.
XIII, § 1.
479. See infra Appendix, Table 1. The bottom panel of the table provides the computation
of the various concepts defined by the statutory apportionment formula. See also CAL. REV. &
TAX. CODE § 96 (West 1987).
480. This attribution of county government revenues to taxpayers follows the approach
later taken in AB 8. See supra note 151. The effective tax allocation rate of the county is 2%
(the ratio of its $1,000 tax allocation to its $50,000 taxable assessed valuation). Therefore,
county government received 2% of each taxpayer's assessed valuation, or $500. The concept
of an "effective tax rate" is common in public finance. See D. HYMAN, PUBLIC FINANCE: A
CONTEMPORARY APPLICATION OF THEORY TO POLICY 685 (1983).
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paid $1,000 in property taxes. The apportionment of countywide property tax revenues transferred $125 from Smith, the taxpayer with the low
total property tax rate before Proposition 13, to Jones, the taxpayer with
the high total property tax rate before Proposition 13. Therefore, Smith
partly finances local governments that do not serve her. In this illustration, 12.5% of Smith's property tax payments finances Jones' local
governments.4 8
Two simple rules summarize the outcome illustrated by the JonesSmith hypothetical. First, residents in tax rate areas with high property
tax rates before Proposition 13 receive transfers from residents in tax rate
areas which had low property tax rates before Proposition 13. Residents
in tax rate areas with high property tax rates before Proposition 13 are
served by local governments whose shares of historical countywide property tax revenues exceeded their historical shares of countywide property
taxable assessed valuation. Second, residents in tax rate areas with low
growth in taxable assessed valuations before Proposition 13 receive transfers from residents in tax rate areas with high growth in taxable assessed
valuations before Proposition 13. This is because residents of tax rate
areas with low growth in taxable assessed valuation before Proposition 13
are in a situation where their historical share of countywide taxable assessed valuation exceeds their current share of countywide taxable assessed valuation.
This revenue transfer violates tax situs. The legislative implementation of Proposition 13 severed the relation between property taxes paid
by residents and the revenues received by their local governments. By
disregarding tax situs, the Legislature destroyed one of the constitutional
pillars of property taxation before Proposition 13.
Modest differences in pre-Proposition 13 tax rates and growth in
taxable assessed valuation translate into significant violations of tax situs.
Table 2 reports a taxpayer's net gain from the violation of tax situs expressed as a percent of her property tax payments.4 82 Taxpayers with a
481. The lesson from the Jones-Smith illustration holds for the case of many taxpayers with
unequal taxable assessed valuations, with different rates of growth in valuation before Proposition 13, and served by many cities, schools, and special districts. For a mathematical proof,
see Constitutional Reform, supra note 118, at 72-79.
482. See infra Appendix, Table 2. The net gain of a taxpayer "i", NG, depends on her preProposition 13 total property tax rate, ti, growth in her taxable assessed valuation from the
historical base period until FY 1978-79, gi, the (assessed value weighted) average countywide
property tax rate before Proposition 13, t, and the growth in countywide assessed valuation, g,
from the historical base period until FY 1978-79. The expression is:
NG, = iti(1 + g)/t(1 + gi) - I}
See R. Smith, The Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues: Constitutional Problems, Fiscal
Consequences and Remedies (Feb. 16, 1989) (unpublished study on file in Loyola of Los Ange-
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relative tax rate4 83 and relative growth factor48 4 of 1.00 neither gain nor
lose from apportioning property tax revenues without regard for tax situs. All other taxpayers are affected by the violation of tax situs.
Only improbable circumstances affecting property taxation before
Proposition 13 would have allowed the legislature's formula to comply
with tax situs. If all taxpayers in a county paid the same total property
tax rate and experienced identical growth in their taxable assessed valuation, then the allocation of countywide property tax revenues would not
have violated tax situs. Total property tax rates and growth in assessed
valuations, however, varied among taxpayers before Proposition 13.
Therefore, the existence of the violation of tax situs does not raise a factual dispute. The only factual questions involve which taxpayers gained
and which lost, and by how much.
B.

Continued Violation of Tax Situs and the Added
Violation of Tax Uniformity

In 1979, the legislature passed AB 8 which changed the apportionment of property tax revenues.48 5 AB 8 used the allocation of property
tax revenues in FY 1978-79 as the base for the tax allocation in FY 197980.486 It also used taxable assessed valuation to "attribute" each local
government's FY 1978-79 allocations among tax rate areas within its
boundaries, and allocated the additional property tax revenues generated
by growth in assessed valuation among these tax rate areas.48 7 These
procedures may appear to avoid the problems with the apportionment of
property tax revenues in FY 1978-79 because they used assessed valuales Law Review) [hereinafter Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues]. The formula gives

the same answer for the Jones-Smith illustration as reported in Table 1. By substituting the
following values: t = .08, tj = .09, t, = .07, g = gj = g = 0, where the subscript "j"refers to
Jones and the subscript "s" refers to Smith, these substitutions yield:
NGj = 1.09/.08 - I I= 12.5% and NG, = {.07/.08 - 1 = -12.5%.
Id.; see infra Appendix, Table 1.

483. A relative tax rate of 1.00 means that the taxpayer's property tax rate equalled the
countywide (taxable assessed value weighted) average property tax rate. A relative tax rate of
1.10 means she paid a 10% higher tax rate before Proposition 13 than the countywide average;
a relative tax rate of 0.90 means she paid a 10% lower rate.
484. A relative growth factor of 1.00 means that the growth in the taxpayer's taxable assessed valuation equalled the growth in countywide taxable assessed valuation. A relative fac-

tor above 1.00 means that the taxpayer's valuation grew faster than countywide valuation; a
relative growth factor below 1.00 means the taxpayer's assessed valuation grew slower.
485. Act effective July 4, 1979, ch. 282, 1979 Cal. Stat. 959 (codified as amended in scattered sections of CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. EDUC. CODE
(West 1989 & Supp. 1990); CAL. GOV'T CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990); CAL. REv. & TAX.
CODE (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE (West 1980 & Supp. 1990)).
486. Id. § 59, 1979 Cal. Stat. 1027 (codified at CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 96 (West 1987)).
487. Id.
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tion and tax rate areas which, by definition, include only local govern-

ments that serve taxpayers. Nevertheless, AB 8 violated tax situs and
also ran afoul of tax uniformity.

The attribution procedure specified by the legislation does not solve
the tax situs violation because it begins with FY 1978-79 allocations and
then attributes revenues to tax rate areas.48 8 That is, the law simply "at-

tributed" Smith's revenues lost in FY 1978-79 among tax rate areas of
Jones' city, schools, and special districts.
The statutory redefinition of FY 1978-79 tax allocations actually
made matters worse. The legislation included specified fractions of state

bail-out funds in each local government's base.489 Since bail-out funds

were also allocated on the basis of property tax collections before Proposition 13,490 the attribution procedure intensified the magnitude of property tax revenues apportioned across jurisdictional boundaries.
Taxpayers in high tax rate, low growth areas came to enjoy a "double

hit" on the property taxes paid by taxpayers in low tax rate, high growth
areas.
The allocation of the annual tax increment created non-uniform tax-

ation. While county government received a uniform effective tax allocation rate in FY 1978-79,49' it now receives a non-uniform rate from the
growth in taxable assessed valuation. County government received
57.1% of the growth in Smith's taxable assessed valuation but only
44.4% of the growth in Jones' taxable assessed valuation. 492 This non-

uniformity punishes the victims of the violations of tax situs with high
county government effective tax allocation rates and rewards the beneficiaries of the violations of tax situs with low county government effective
tax allocation rates. Over time, the effective tax allocation rate received

by county government becomes increasingly non-uniform, not less.49 3
488. CAL. REV. & TAx. CODE § 96(d) (West 1987).
489. Id. § 96(a).
490. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 16250 (West 1987).
491. See supra note 480.
492. In the hypothetical county, there are only two tax rate areas (Jones and Smith). The
attribution of revenues is shown in the bottom panel of Table 3. See infra Appendix. The
county's allocation factor of the annual tax increment from Smith equals 57.1% [500/
(500+80+220+75)] and from Jones equals 44.4% [500/(500+320+280+25)]. As described above, county government receives an allocation factor of the annual tax increment

from each tax rate area equal to the ratio of its attributed property tax revenues to total attributed revenues of that tax rate area. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
493. See infra Appendix, Figure 1. The effective tax allocation rates in Figure 1 were computed by dividing the attributed revenues county government receives from the indicated taxpayer by her assessed valuation. According to the California Revenue and Taxation Code,
attributed revenues of county government were defined as the difference between a tax rate
area's revenues and the allocations received by the city, school districts, and special districts
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This non-uniformity violates section 1 of article XIII of the California Constitution, which requires uniform tax rates.494 Too much of the
growth in Smith's assessed valuation supports county government, and
too little is allocated to support Smith's other local governments. In contrast, too little of the growth in Jones' assessed valuation supports county
government, and too much is allocated to support Jones' other local
governments.
In the hypothetical, only county government tax rates are non-uniform because the boundaries of each city were assumed coterminous with
the boundaries of school districts and special districts.49 5 This assumption is unrealistic. Taxpayers in tax rate areas where special districts or
school districts levied higher property tax rates before Proposition 13
now pay a smaller portion of their taxes to city government than taxpayers in tax rate areas with low special district or school district tax rates
before Proposition 13. In effect, a city government receives as many different fractions of the growth in its taxpayers' assessed valuations as
there are distinct tax rate areas within its boundaries. For similar reasons, a school district or special district receives as many different fractions of the growth in its taxpayers' assessed valuations as there are
distinct tax rate areas within its boundaries. The allocation of the annual
tax increment yields non-uniform taxation as the rule, not the exception.
Smith's losses from the revenue transfers grow, rather than diminish, over time.49 6 The analysis assumes that Jones' and Smith's assessed
valuations grow at a 9% annual rate.49 7 As discussed, Smith lost $125
from the violation of tax situs in FY 1978-79; 49" she suffered no loss from
non-uniform taxation in FY 1978-79 because the violations of tax uniformity did not begin until FY 1979-80. 499 Because the growth in property taxes is allocated to governments that serve the taxpayer, the loss
from the violation of tax situs remains constant. However, Smith's excessive contributions to county government begin with the non-uniform
allocation of the growth in her property tax payments to county government. Unless the problems with existing law are corrected, her losses
that serve taxpayers in that tax rate area. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 97.35(b)(2) (West

1987).
494. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1(b) ("All property... assessed shall be taxed in proportion
to its full value.").
495. See supra note 477.
496. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
497. Smith's losses and Jones' gains from non-uniformity would be higher for faster growth
rates and smaller for slower growth rates.
498. See supra text accompanying note 481.
499. See supra notes 491-93 and accompanying text.
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will become larger, dominated increasingly by the violation of tax uniformity. Within ten to fifteen years, Smith's losses from the apportionment of countywide property tax revenues will stabilize at between 8-9%
of her property tax payments. 5" Jones' gains from the unconstitutional
apportionment of countywide property tax revenues grow in tandem
with Smith's losses.50 1
C. Case Studies of the Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues
Smith and Jones, the respective loser and winner from the violations
of tax situs and tax uniformity in our hypothetical county, have counterparts in the real world. The revenue transfers are significant and will
grow until existing law is reformed. The case studies were limited to a
few cities because the study of property tax allocations for taxpayers in a
city requires the collection of extensive data from the reports that county
auditors use to apportion property tax revenues under existing law. Over
27,000 numbers had to be collected for the case studies. 50 2 By studying
the allocation of property taxes in two counties, San Bernardino and Los
Angeles, the case studies illustrate how the constitutional problems with
existing law are a statewide concern.
1. Methodology
The case studies compare the property taxes levied on residents in
selected cities with the tax allocations collected by all local governments
that serve these residents. Because residents are served by many different
combinations of local governments, the analysis is based on tax rate areas. The property tax levied on taxpayers in a tax rate area can be easily
computed as 1% of taxable assessed valuation. The difficult measurement is attribution of the property tax allocations received by local governments to taxpayers in a tax rate area. The study attributes the tax
allocations received by local governments among tax rate areas by a
500. The decline in the share of property tax payments lost for the early fiscal years is
explained by two factors. First, Smith's losses from the violation of tax situs are fixed and,
therefore, become a smaller fraction of her growing property tax payments. Recall, however,
that the illustration ignores how AB 8's shift in the property tax base increased the fiscal
consequences of the violation of tax situs. See supra notes 489-90 and accompanying text.
Second, the loss from non-uniformity is not significant in the early years of the apportionment
of countywide property tax revenues. After 10 years, that loss becomes large and its growth
almost matches the growth in Smith's property tax payments. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
501. See infra Appendix, Table 3.
502. For the cities in San Bernardino County, the study included 54 tax rate areas served by
32 local governments. For the cities in Los Angeles County, the study included 526 tax rate
areas served by 154 local governments. For a more detailed description of methodology and
data sources, see Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 18-23, 46-50.
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method based on the constitutional principles of tax situs and tax uniformity. According to tax situs, only those tax rate areas within the
boundaries of a local government should receive an attribution of that
local government's tax allocation.50 3 According to tax uniformity, a local government's tax allocation should be apportioned among its tax rate
areas on the basis of taxable assessed valuation." ° For example, if a tax
rate area has 10% of a local government's taxable assessed valuation, it
would be attributed with 10% of that local government's property tax
allocation. The property tax system before Proposition 13 followed these
principles. 5
The difference between the property taxes paid by taxpayers in a tax
rate area and the attributed revenues of all local governments serving
those taxpayers measures the degree to which existing law violates tax
situs and tax uniformity. If property tax payments exceed attributed revenues, then taxpayers lose from the unconstitutional apportionment of
property tax revenues. If property tax payments are less than attributed
revenues, then taxpayers gain from the existing law's constitutional
infirmities.
In the case studies, attributed revenues are estimated with and without adjustment for the Special District Augmentation Fund (SDAF).5 °6
Attributed revenues without the SDAF adjustment use the property tax
allocations of special districts ignoring the contributions to and receipts
from the SDAF. The reason for ignoring the SDAF adjustment is that
the financial transactions of the SDAF reflect budget allocation decisions
of County Board of Supervisors. 0 7 Attributed revenues with the SDAF
adjustment use the property tax allocations of special districts, less their
contribution to the SDAF, plus monies received from the SDAF. The
theory of SDAF adjustment is that these monies are property tax revenues raised under the 1% limit. However, it is unnecessary to choose
between the theories concerning the SDAF adjustment. The conclusions
503. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 14.
504. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 1. The Legislature followed this approach when it defined

how revised FY 1978-79 tax allocations of jurisdictions were to be attributed among tax rate
areas. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 97.5 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990). This attribution procedure, however, did not solve the constitutional problems of existing law. See supra note 408
and accompanying text.
505. See supra note 478 and accompanying text.
506. Section 98.6 of the California Revenue & Taxation Code deducts a contribution to the
SDAF from the property tax allocations of special districts. CAL. REV. & TAX CODE § 98.6
(West 1987 & Supp. 1990). The County Board of Supervisors then allocates the SDAF among
special districts. Id. § 98.6(k).
507. Id. § 98.6.
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drawn from the case studies do not depend on whether the computation
of attributed revenues includes the SDAF adjustment.
2.

Findings for San Bernardino County

Taxpayers in the cities of Rancho Cucamonga and Redlands were
selected for the San Bernardino County case study of property tax allocations."' Rancho Cucamonga was selected because it is a high growth
area, 50 9 so its taxpayers are expected to lose from the violation of tax
situs and tax uniformity. Redlands was selected because the city had the
second highest pre-Proposition 13 property tax rate in the county,510 so
its taxpayers are expected to benefit from the existing law's constitutional
problems.
The differential treatment of city governments is the most striking
feature of the apportionment of property taxes under existing law. The
City of Rancho Cucamonga received an effective tax allocation rate of
only 4.70 cents per $100 taxable assessed valuation; the City of Redlands
received an effective tax allocation rate of 30.60 cents-six andII a half
5
times the amount received by the City of Rancho Cucamonga.
In FY 1987-88, taxpayers in Rancho Cucamonga paid more, and
taxpayers in Redlands paid less in property taxes than their respective
local governments received. 5 12 The estimated loss for taxpayers in
Rancho Cucamonga is $2,960,360 with the SDAF adjustment, and
$2,681,180 without the SDAF adjustment. 1 ' The estimated gains for
taxpayers in Redlands is $501,738 with the SDAF adjustment, and
$702,553 without the SDAF adjustment.51 4 Taxpayer losses in Rancho
Cucamonga equal 14% to 16% of their city's own revenues of $18.4 million.51 5 Taxpayer gains in Redlands equal 2% to 3% of their city's own
508. The property taxes paid by taxpayers and the property tax allocations received by local
governments are net of the financial transactions of redevelopment agencies. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 22.
509. The estimated population of the City of Rancho Cucamonga on June 30, 1988, was
71% higher than the population reported in the 1980 federal census. See STATE CONTROLLER'S OFFICE, ANNUAL REPORT 1987-88, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING CITIES

IN CALIFORNIA Table 1, at 2. Statewide population increased by 22% over the same time
period.
510. See STATE CONTROLLER'S OFFICE, 1977 ANNUAL REPORT, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING CITIES OF CALIFORNIA Table 19A, at 343.
511. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 23; see also id. Appendix B, Table B-2.
512. See infra Appendix, Table 4.

513. Id.
514. Id.
515. Id.
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revenues of $22.8 million. 16
Existing law apportions a non-uniform share of growth in property
taxes to county government. San Bernardino County receives 35.2% of
the growth in property taxes paid by taxpayers in Rancho Cucamonga,
but only 30.8% of the growth in property taxes paid by taxpayers in
Redlands.5 17
The revenue transfers will grow substantially over the next ten
years.5 18 The annual loss of taxpayers in Rancho Cucamonga will reach
$3.5 million by FY 1989-90, $5.6 million by FY 1994-95, and $7.3 mil520
lion by FY 1997-98." 19 The cumulative loss will exceed $50 million.
In contrast, the annual gain of taxpayers in Redlands will 'more than
double over the same time period, and the cumulative gain will be $8.5
million.52 1
3.

Findings for Los Angeles County

Taxpayers in the cities of Los Angeles, Carson, Compton, El
Segundo, and Temple City were selected for the case study of property
tax allocations in Los Angeles County. 52 2 The City of Los Angeles was
selected because it levied the highest pre-Proposition 13 city property tax
rate in the county. 523 Therefore, its taxpayers are expected to benefit
significantly from the violations of tax situs and tax uniformity. Carson
and Temple City were selected because they are no property tax citiesthey are excluded from the apportionment of property tax revenues because they did not levy a property tax in FY 1977-78 to pay for city
services.524 Compton was selected because it is a contract city which
516. Id.
517. Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 24.
518. See infra Appendix, Table 5. Two assumptions were made in forecasting future transfers: (1) the ratio of the taxpayers' transfers to their property tax payments will remain at the
FY 1987-88 level; and, (2) taxable assessed valuation will grow at an annual rate of 9%. The
first assumption is a reasonable approximation ten to fifteen years into the implementation of
Proposition 13. See infra note 539. The second assumption was recently made by the Legislative Analyst Office in preparing its forecasts of the fiscal effects of AB 1197-a bill which
added Section 97.35 to the Revenue & Taxation Code. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 97.35

(West 1987).
519. See infra Appendix, Table 5.
520. Id.
521. Id.
522. The Los Angeles County Auditor and Controller Office granted access to records for
property tax allocations for FY 1986-87. Unlike the reports used in the San Bernardino case
study, the Los Angeles reports covered property tax allocations before adjustments for the
financial transactions of redevelopment agencies. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 24-25 n.40.
523. See FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS supra note 510, Table 19A, at 339.
524. Id.
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levied a low property tax rate before Proposition 13.525 El Segundo was
selected because it is a full-service city that levied a low property tax rate
before Proposition 13.526
As with the cities in San Bernardino County, the differential treatment of city governments is the most striking feature of the apportionment of property tax revenues. City government in Carson and Temple
City received effective tax allocation rates of 0 cents per $100 assessed
valuation. 527 City government in El Segundo and Compton received effective tax allocation rates of 4.29 cents and 14.77 cents, respectively.5 2 8
In contrast, the City of Los Angeles received an effective tax allocation
rate of 33.61 cents-eight times El Segundo's rate and more than twice
5 29
Compton's rate.
In FY 1986-87, taxpayers in the City of Los Angeles gained, and
taxpayers in the other four cities lost from the violations of tax situs and
tax uniformity. 30 Taxpayers in Los Angeles paid $70,580,666 less in
property taxes than property tax allocations received by their local governments. 5 31 This takes into account the financing of the SDAF. Their
gains were $77,855,906 if the SDAF is ignored. Taxpayers in El Segundo
suffered the greatest losses-$S10,294,123 with, or $10,021,455 without,
adjustment for the SDAF1 32 Taxpayers in Carson lost about $3 million
and taxpayers in the other cities lost lesser amounts.5 3 3
Non-uniform taxation also prevails in Los Angeles County. Los
Angeles County government receives only 43.3% of the growth in property tax revenues paid by taxpayers in the City of Los Angeles, but it
receives more from taxpayers in the other four cities: Los Angeles
County is allocated 66.9% of the growth in property taxes paid by taxpayers in El Segundo and about 50% of the growth in property taxes
5 34
paid by taxpayers in the other three cities.
The revenue transfers will grow substantially over the next ten
525. Id.
526. Id.
527. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at appendix C, table C2.
528. Id.
529. Id.
530. See infra Appendix, Table 6.
531. Id.
532. Id.
533. Id. Taxpayers' losses are significant relative to a city's own revenues, especially in El
Segundo and Carson. The gain of taxpayers in Los Angeles equal about 4% of that city's own
revenues of $1.9 billion. Id.
534. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 26.
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years.5 35 The annual gain of taxpayers in the City of Los Angeles will
reach $92 million by FY 1989-90, $145 million by FY 1994-95, and $190
million by FY 1997-98. The cumulative gain will be $1.3 billion. 36 By
FY 1997-98, the annual loss of taxpayers in El Segundo will reach $28
million and in Carson $9 million. 3 7 The cumulative loss of the taxpay53
ers in the four cities will exceed a quarter of a billion dollars. 1
D. Existing Law Can Not Be Salvaged by Legal Interpretation
The argument that existing law violates the California Constitution
assumes that tax situs and other provisions of California's fiscal constitution remain valid after Proposition 13. California case law compels a
simple answer to the question of whether Proposition 13 destroyed the
local property tax, or repealed, by implication, other provisions of the
California Constitution. Tax situs, fiscal home rule, and uniform taxation, of course, are constitutional constraints that pre-date Proposition
11" Furthermore, Proposition 13 did not repeal expressly or by implication any of the thirty-three sections of article XIII.5 1
If Proposition 13 made the property tax a state, new county or local
tax, then perhaps the constitutional constraints from the "old" system no
longer apply to the "new" tax system. This approach, in fact, was taken
by an appellate court when it held moot a dispute over how Los Angeles
County spent its property taxes before Proposition 13. 1 The court concluded that Proposition 13 had made the property tax a new "countywide" tax, because SB 154 and AB 8 had limited the tax rates levied by
local governments to the debt overrides. 42
If the Legislature had repealed traditional local tax powers and replaced them with a new countywide tax, then the Legislature would have
violated many sections of the California Constitution. Under article
XIIIA, section 3, the Legislature is prohibited from levying any new
taxes on real property after Proposition 13." If the 1% property tax is a
535. See infra Appendix, Table 7. The same two assumptions were made in forecasting

future transfers as was made in the case study for San Bernardino County. See supra note 518.
536. See infra Appendix, Table 7.
537. Id.
538. Id.
539. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text.
540. See supra notes 190-223 and accompanying text.
541. City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles, 147 Cal. App. 3d 954, 195 Cal. Rptr.
465 (1983).
542. Id. at 956, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 467. The debt overrides were authorized by article XIIIA,
section 1(b) of the California Constitution.
543. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA, § 3.
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different one from the traditional property tax, the Legislature exceeded
its authority to impose new ad valorem taxes on real property.
Any "countywide tax" in its current form would also be unconstitutional, even if the Legislature was not prohibited from levying such a
property tax."4 The allocation formula instructs county government
how to spend the proceeds of its tax. Article XIII, section 24, which
prohibits the Legislature from imposing local taxes for local purposes,
applies to counties as well as cities and other forms of local government. 45 Moreover, existing law treats chartered and general law local
governments the same,5 46 even though the California Constitution prohibits the Legislature from interfering in the municipal and fiscal affairs
of chartered governments. 47 Finally, the tax situs cases showed that
simply keeping the monies in the right county does not guarantee constitutionality, because monies cannot cross jurisdictional lines, nor can one
local government transfer funds to other local governments, even if those
other governments serve the same population. 48
The California Supreme Court has recognized that the property tax
has remained a local one. 549 The court concluded that Proposition 13
did not destroy or annul local tax powers, and a property tax limitation
should not be confused with revocation of the power to tax property. 5 0
Additionally, California courts have held that Proposition 13 did not repeal, expressly or by implication sections 1, 12, or 19 of article XIII of
the California Constitution.5 51 Furthermore, courts have narrowly construed Proposition 13 as providing effective property tax relief and as not
5 52
abrogating the home rule powers of local governments.
In Amador Valley Joint Union High School Districtv. State Board of
Equalization,the court interpreted section 2237 of the Revenue and Taxation Code as instructing the counties to collect the 1% tax on behalf of
544. Id.
545. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24.
546. See supra notes 129-73 and accompanying text.
547. CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 24.
548. See supra notes 374-84 and accompanying text.
549. Amador Valley Joint Union High School Dist. v. State Bd. of Equal., 22 Cal. 3d 208,
222, 583 P.2d 1281, 1285, 144 Cal. Rptr. 239, 243' (1978).
550. Id. at 226, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245.
551. ITT World Communications, Inc. v. City and County of San Francisco, 37 Cal. 3d
859, 871, 693 P.2d 811, 820-21, 210 Cal. Rptr. 226, 335 (1983) (Proposition 13 did not repeal
article XIII, section 19); Board of Supervisors v. Lonergan, 27 Cal. 3d 855, 868-69, 616 P.2d
802, 810, 167 Cal. Rptr. 820, 828 (1980) (Proposition 13 did not repeal article XIII, section
12); State Bd. of Equal. v. Board of Supervisors, 105 Cal. App. 3d 813, 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. 739,
745 (1980) (Proposition 13 did not repeal article XIII, section 1).
552. Amador, 22 Cal. 3d at 225, 583 P.2d at 1287, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 245; State Bd. of
EquaL, 105 Cal. App. 3d at 823, 164 Cal. Rptr. at 745.
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local governments.5 53 The 1% limit on countywide property tax does
not prevent local governments from collecting property taxes; this interpretation is supported by official ballot analyses of Proposition B."
The Attorney General's Summary stated that Proposition 13 would
"limit ad valorem taxes on real property, 5 55 not repeal the property tax
powers of local government. Furthermore, the Attorney General's Summary stated the financial impact of Proposition 13 to be "annual losses of
local government property tax revenues (approximately $7 billion in FY
1978-79), ' 1556 not the loss of the entire local property tax base. The Legislative Analyst essentially agreed with the Attorney General. The Legislative Analyst stated that Proposition 13 would "place a limit on the
amount of property taxes to be collected by local governments, ' 557 not
repeal local powers to tax property. The Legislative Analyst also used,
rather than discarded, constitutional principles of property taxation to
interpret key ambiguities in the language of Proposition 13.558
Concluding that Proposition 13 had changed the property tax, the
appellate court in City of Los Angeles v. County of Los Angeles 55 9 noted
that following the California Supreme Court's decision in Amador, sec5 60
tion 2237 of the Revenue and Taxation Code had been repealed.
Therefore, the court concluded, this portion of the Supreme Court's decision became irrelevant. 6 1 The appellate court's analysis is flawed on two
grounds. First, while section 2237 had been repealed, the legislature had
used virtually identical language in adding section 93 to the Revenue and
Taxation Code. 62 Second, the appellate court did not explain how the
legislature could have repealed, via statute, article XIII of the California
Constitution.
The Legislature itself intended for the property tax to remain a local
tax. 563 The Legislature added section 100 to the Revenue and Taxation
Code to allow any local government to reduce its allocation from the 1%
tax. 5-6 This type of local discretion is the litmus test for a tax to be
553. 22 Cal. 3d 208, 246, 583 P.2d 1281, 1300, 149 Cal. Rptr. 239, 258 (1978).
554. CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 56.

555. Id.
556. Id. at 60.

557. Id.
558. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
559. 147 Cal. App. 3d 954, 195 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1983).
560. Id. at 958, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 468.

561. Id.
562. Compare CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 2237 (1978, repealed 1980) and CAL. REV. &

TAX. CODE § 93 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
563. See supra notes 174-80 and accompanying text.
564. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE § 100 (West 1987).
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locally imposed. 6 5 Moreover, even though the apportionment formula
added by AB 8566 has constitutional problems, the legislature relies on
tax situs and tax uniformity to guide its design of the apportionment
formula.56 7 Its use of tax rate areas to allocate the annual tax increment
keeps property taxes part of the tax base of local jurisdictions as required
by tax situs 68 In defining the revised base period tax allocations for FY
1979-80, the Legislature's attribution among tax rate areas of the property tax allocation received by local governments in FY 1978-79 relies on
5 69
tax uniformity.
Nor can it be argued that Proposition 13 made the property tax a
state tax. Before Proposition 13, the state levied no property tax. While
section 3 of article XIIIA permits changes in state taxes provided that
increased rates are approved by two-thirds of all members elected to both
houses of the Legislature, 570 it expressly prohibits the state from levying
new property taxes. 57 1 In addition, the constitutional history of tax situs
has protected the power of local government to tax property. 72 The
Legislature cannot reverse almost a century of constitutional case law
simply because it wishes to accommodate supporters of local spending
programs seeking protection from the fiscal restraint imposed by Proposition 13. "[F]iscal disruption threatened by Proposition 13 cannot be
invoked by the state legislature as an excuse for abrogating the home rule
powers of cities and counties. '573 Logic dictates that the same attitude
be taken toward article XIII, sections 1, 14, and 24 of the California
Constitution.
Neither can existing law be salvaged by the reasoning in Marin Hospital Districtv. Rothman. 74 The Rothman court concluded that the apportionment of property tax revenues does not violate equal protection or
revoke "vested tax powers. ' 575 The constitutional problems with existing law concern tax situs and tax uniformity, not equal protection.
565. McCabe v. Carpenter, 102 Cal. 469 (1894).
566. See CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE, §§ 95-100 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990).
567. See supra notes 177-78 and accompanying text.
568. See CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 98 (West 1987 & Supp. 1990); see also supra note 162
and accompanying text.
569. See CAL. REv. & TAx. CODE § 98(f)(1), (f)(2) (West 1987); see also supra note 504
and accompanying text.
570. CAL. CONST. art. XIIIA.
571. Id.
572. See supra notes 312-406 and accompanying text.
573. Lefcoe & Allison, supra note 65, at 219; see also Sonoma County Org. Pub. Employees
v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979).
574. 139 Cal. App. 3d 495, 188 Cal. Rptr. 828 (1983).
575. Id. at 501, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 832.
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The court in Rothman relied on two California cases to support its view
that "local public agencies have no vested right to impose taxes."57' 6 The
court's analysis of "vested tax powers" is flawed.
The first case relied on by the court in Rothman, 5 7 simply stands
for the proposition that county government has no vested right to tax the
property of an irrigation district because the California Constitution exempts property of public agencies from taxation. 578 The power to tax
property granted by article XIII, section 1 cannot override constitutionally granted exemptions. The second case cited by the Rothman court,
County of Alameda v. Janssen,5 79 did not expressly address the issue of
vested tax powers.5 °
The Rothman court also relied on the California Supreme Court's
decision, In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill,5 8 1 to support the
proposition that "[special district] taxingagencieshave no vested right to
powers of taxation., 582 However, the cited language itself is a quote from
County of Mariposa v. MercedIrrigationalDistrict.8 3 Therefore, Bunker
Hill offers no new analysis of vested tax powers. Moreover, the issue in
Bunker Hill involved a challenge to the effects the Bunker Hill redevelopment project would have on the allocation of property taxes among
local agencies.5 84 The California Supreme Court upheld the constitution-

ality of the tax allocation plan, reasoning that the California Constitution
empowered the Legislature to devise tax allocation schemes for redevel576. Id. (citing Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 186-88 (1923); County of Mariposa v.
Merced Irr. Dist., 32 Cal. 2d 467, 474, 196 P.2d 920, 922 (1948); County of Alameda v. Janssen, 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940)) (emphasis in original). Even though the court cited
Trenton v. New Jersey, this decision did not address issues involving the California Constitution. The United States Supreme Court noted the importance of provisions in state constitutions when it observed that, in the absence of state constitutional provisions, municipalities
have no inherent right of self-government beyond the legislative control of the State. 262 U.S.
182, 187 (1923). The California fiscal constitution contains many such provisions which must
be considered in a principled analysis of local property tax powers. The United States
Supreme Court recognized these powers forty years earlier when it decided Californiav. Central Pacific Railroad. 127 U.S. 1 (1888).
577. County of Mariposa v. Merced Irr. Dist., 32 Cal. 2d 467, 196 P.2d 920 (1948).
578. Id. at 474, 196 P.2d at 924.
579. 16 Cal. 2d 276, 106 P.2d 11 (1940).
580. The issue in Jansseninvolved a challenge to the state government aiding aged indigents
by authorizing the release of liens previously acquired on properties. The County Board of
Supervisors was acting for the state in dispersing old age relief. Id. at 284, 106 P.2d at 15-16.
581. 61 Cal. 2d 21, 389 P.2d 538, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, cert denied sub nom. Babcock v. Community Redev. Agency, 379 U.S. 899 (1964).
582. Rothman, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 188 Cal.Rptr. at 832 (emphasis in original).
583. 32 Cal. 2d at 474, 196 P.2d at 924 (quoted in In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker
Hill, 61 Cal. 2d 21, 73, 389 P.2d 538, 572, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 108, cerL deniedsub nom. Babcock
v. Community Redev. Agency, 379 U.S. 899 (1964)).
584. Bunker Hill, 61 Cal. 2d at 71, 389 P.2d at 570-71, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 106.
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opment projects. 85
In sum, statutory interpretation cannot salvage existing law. As recognized by California courts, Proposition 13 limited the property taxes
collected by local governments. By limiting taxation, however, Proposition 13 did not destroy the power of local governments to tax property,
nor did it overturn other constitutional provisions which date from the
19th and early 20th centuries.
VI.

RfSTORING THE FISCAL CONSTITUTION

This Article now turns to the final and most important question.
What apportionment formula implements Proposition 13 without violating the California Constitution? Proposition 13 can be implemented
without violating tax situs and tax uniformity if existing law is modified
to use a two-step procedure:
1) Divide countywide collections of the 1% property tax
among different types of local governments-county, cities,
types of school districts, types of special districts (e.g. flood,
fire, sanitation, water, etc.);
2) Within each category of local government, apportion revenues on the basis of the taxable assessed valuation of local
governments.
The resulting tax allocations translate the 1% tax limit imposed by Proposition 13 into a set of maximum tax rates for local government that
satisfy tax situs and tax uniformity.
When used in conjunction with the second step, the first step assures
that county government receives the same share of each taxpayer's property taxes; it guarantees that the apportionment of property taxes satisfies
tax uniformity. The second step assures that each local government receives only the amount of property taxes paid by taxpayers within its
boundaries; the second step thus guarantees that the apportionment of
property tax revenues satisfies tax situs.
This remedy limits, but does not eliminate, the role of the Legislature in deciding how property tax revenues should be apportioned. The
Legislature must still decide how to divide countywide property taxes
among different types of local governments. If it wished, the Legislature
could use the provisions of existing law. If it decided to amend existing
law, the Legislature would have to treat all cities, all school districts of a
585. Id. at 72-73, 339 P.2d at 571, 37 Cal. Rptr. at 107; see also CAL. CONST. art. XIII, § 19
(1954) (current version at art. XVI, § 16 (1990)).
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particular type, and all special districts of a particular type on a uniform
basis.
The second step of the allocation could be implemented in two ways.
The simple remedy would divide revenues without regard to whether all
tax rate areas are served by all types of local government. The thorough
remedy would use a credit/debit scheme in which a city's allocation from
the simple remedy would be increased if that city provided its residents
with services that residents in other cities received from special districts,
and a city's allocation would be reduced if its residents receive services
from special districts offered by "full-service" cities.
The choice between the simple and thorough remedy depends on the
desired degree of precision. If courts demand correction of constitutional
violations to the "very last penny," then they should embrace the thorough remedy. If they would be content with substantial compliance with
constitutional principles, the simple remedy will do. In either event, reform could be implemented easily and would address the constitutional
issues which remain unsolved despite recent legislation modifying the apportionment of countywide property tax revenues.5" 6
The analysis assumes that the Legislature uses the tax allocations
from existing law to define the first stage allocation among different types
of local government. This assumption demonstrates that the second
stage allocations are the key to overcoming the constitutional problems
with existing law. The remedies would result in a reallocation of property tax revenues among local governments of the same type, but would
not change the division of countywide property tax revenues among
county government, cities as a group, schools as a group, and special
districts as a group.
A.

The Simple Remedy

The simple remedy requires two computatiods: first, the revenue
pools for each type of local government are created; second, each revenue
pool is divided among local governments of the same type on the basis of
taxable assessed valuation. For example, if the taxable assessed valuation
of the City of Los Angeles is half of the taxable assessed valuation of all
cities in Los Angeles County, then the City of Los Angeles would receive
half the city revenue pool-nothing more, nothing less.
The simple remedy corrects the constitutional problems with existing law. 87 This is illustrated by reconsidering the allocation of prop586. See infra notes 613-20 and accompanying text.
587. For a mathematical proof, see Constitutional Reform, supra note 118, at 95-97.
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erty tax revenues in the hypothetical Jones-Smith county. 588 Under the
first stage allocation, county government would receive 50% of countywide property tax revenues, the city pool 20%, the school pool 25%, and
the special district pool 5%. These percentages are the shares of preProposition 13 property tax revenues as well as the distribution, under
existing law, of property tax revenues among the different types of
government.
The second stage allocates the city pool among cities, the school
pool among schools, and the special district pool among special districts.
The allocations are made in proportion to each local government's taxable assessed valuation. 8 9 As a result, Smith's property tax payments are
divided as follows: $500 to county government; $200 to her city; $250 to
her schools; and $50 to her special districts. Since county government
receives 50% of each taxpayer's property tax payments, the simple remedy satisfies tax uniformity.
Jones, of course, loses the $125 revenue transfer she received under
existing law. The simple remedy avoids this unconstitutional transfer because each taxpayer pays property taxes, and each of her local governments receives property tax allocations on the basis of her taxable
assessed valuation. Therefore, the apportionment of countywide property tax revenues under the simple remedy would satisfy tax situs.
Not only do the property tax allocations under the simple remedy
yield a uniform effective tax allocation rate for county government, they
also create a uniform effective tax allocation rate for each type of local
government. Both city governments, for example, would receive a
0.80% rate on their residents' taxable assessed valuation.5 90
Uniformity of tax rates across different jurisdictions, of course, is
not required by section 1 of article XIII of the California Constitution,
which requires only uniform taxation within a given jurisdiction. 9 1 Inevitably, however, property taxation under a fixed limit that satisfies tax
situs will also yield uniform taxation among local governments of the
same type. If each taxpayer is served by one local government, each local
government receives a uniform tax rate equal to the tax limit. The presence of overlapping jurisdictions does not change the fact that a uniform
588. See infra Appendix, Table-8. The top panel reproduces the pre-Proposition 13 situation from Table 3. The bottom panel lists the allocation of FY 1978-79 countywide property
tax revenues under the simple remedy.
589. Recall that Jones and Smith have identical assessed valuations. See supra note 478 and
accompanying text. Therefore, each city receives half the city pool of property tax revenues,
each school half the school pool, and each special district half the special district pool.
590. See infra Appendix, Table 9.
591. See CAL. CONsT. art. XIII, § 1.
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tax limit should yield uniform taxation unless, of course, local governments exercise their discretion to collect less than the maximum tax rate.
The gains realized and losses incurred from correcting the constitutional problems with existing law reflect the fiscal effects of moving to
uniform taxation for each type of government.5 92 Local governments receiving high effective tax allocation rates for their type of government
under existing law lose revenue under the simple remedy; local governments receiving low effective tax allocation rates for their type of government under existing law gain.5 93 Existing law had allocated to Jones' city
and schools higher effective tax allocation rates than to Smith's city and
schools, and Jones' special districts were subject to a lower effective tax
allocation rate than Smith's special districts. For Jones, her city would
lose $120 and her schools $30, but her special districts would gain $25on net, reversing her $125 gain from the violation of tax situs. 594 For
Smith, her city would gain $120 and her schools $30, but her special
districts would lose $25-on net, reversing her $125 loss.595
Since county government would receive a uniform effective allocation tax rate from all taxpayers, the simple remedy also provides for uniformity in the allocation of the growth in property tax revenues. The
simple remedy would therefore correct both the tax situs and tax uniformity problems inherent in the existing apportionment of countywide
property tax revenues.
B.

The Thorough Remedy

Not all taxpayers are served by each type of special district. Some
cities have their own fire departments, while other cities contract with
fire districts to provide their residents with fire department services. The
question arises whether reform of existing law can accommodate this feature of local government while satisfying tax situs and tax uniformity.
The following illustration of a five-taxpayer hypothetical county shows
how the simple remedy can be modified so that the resulting allocation of
property tax revenues satisfies tax situs to the very last penny.
Consider the five taxpayers in Table 10.596 For simplicity, assume
that the only special district in the county is a fire district. Taxpayers A,
B, and D reside in cities which have their own fire departments. Taxpayers C and E receive fire protection from the fire district. As shown in the
592. See infra Appendix, Table 9.

593. Id.
594. Id.
595. Id.
596. See infra Appendix, Table 10.
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bottom panel, taxpayers A, B, and C pay less in property taxes than
monies received by their local governments; taxpayers D and E pay more
in property taxes than monies received by their local governments. 9 7
Consider the apportionment of property tax revenues under the simple remedy. As with the Jones-Smith illustration, the county receives a
uniform effective tax allocation rate (1.36%) from each taxpayer. Each
city receives an effective tax allocation rate of 0.40%, each school a rate
of 2.14%, and the fire district a rate of 0.27%.598 The simple remedy
creates its own set of revenue transfers; however, they are smaller in
magnitude than the transfers under existing law. Taxpayers C and E pay
less in property taxes than received by their local governments. Taxpayers A, B, and D pay more in taxes than received by their local governments. While existing law redistributes revenues from taxpayers in preProposition 13 low-tax rate jurisdictions to taxpayers in pre-Proposition
13 high-tax rate jurisdictions, 9 9 the simple remedy redistributes revenues
from those taxpayers not served by fire districts to those taxpayers served
by fire districts.
A modification of the simple remedy's revenue allocations avoids
the revenue transfers. The $27.16 loss of taxpayers A, B, and D equals
the amount of money each would have received had the total fire district
allocation ($135.83) been apportioned among all taxpayers without regard to whether each taxpayer had a fire district.'
Moreover, the gain
of taxpayers C and E equals the total losses of taxpayers A, B, and D
apportioned among themselves in proportion to their taxable assessed
valuations.6 ' 1 Therefore, the transfers from the simple remedy can be
avoided by adjusting city allocations. Cities A, B, and D could receive a
credit for their provision of fire service. Cities C and E could receive a
debit for shifting the responsibility for fire protection to a special district.
The thorough remedy uses a credit/debit scheme based on three
pieces of information: (1) the effective tax rates of special districts under
597. In the illustration, the (assessed value weighted average) countywide property tax rate
before Proposition 13 was 11.78%. Therefore, taxpayers A, B, and C paid above average
property tax rates and taxpayers D and E paid below average property tax rates before Proposition 13.
598. See infra Appendix, Table 11 (top panel). These effective rates are computed by taking
the ratio of a local government's tax allocation to its assessed valuation.
599. See text following supra note 48 1.
600. Recall that each taxpayer has 20% of countywide taxable assessed valuation. Therefore, the apportionment of the fire district allocation among all taxpayers would yield $27.16
(0.20 X $135.83).
601. Because taxpayers C and E have identical assessed valuations, the apportionment of
their total gain on the basis of assessed valuation is the same as them equally dividing their
total gain.
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the simple remedy; (2) city contracting ratios (for each type of special
district, the share of total city taxable assessed valuation served by that
type of special district); and (3) whether taxpayers in a particular city are
served by that special district. If a city provides its own service, it receives a city credit equal to its taxable assessed valuation multiplied by
the effective tax allocation rate of the special district type multiplied by
the city contracting ratio. For example, cities serving taxpayers A, B,
and D add a credit of $27.16 to their original city allocation because they
have their own fire departments.60 z If a city contracts for a service, it
receives a city debit equal to its taxable assessed valuation multiplied by
the effective tax allocation rate of the special district type multiplied by
one minus the city contracting ratio. For example, cities serving taxpayers C and E subtract a debit from their original city allocation of $40.75
because they contracted for fire services.60 3 This credit/debit scheme allocates countywide property tax revenues and complies with tax situs to
the very last penny.6 °4
Under the thorough remedy, effective city tax allocation rates vary
among jurisdictions. Inclusive of the credit/debit for fire districts, cities
serving taxpayers A, B, and D receive an effective tax allocation rate of
0.50% and cities serving taxpayers C and E receive an effective tax allocation rate of 0.23%.605 The city tax allocation rates are still uniform
among cities that provide the same bundle of local services.
In sum, the thorough remedy satisfies tax situs, regardless of the
complex, "patchwork" structure of special districts.60 6 It guarantees uniform taxation within any given jurisdiction. It therefore achieves that
which has eluded the legislature since voters approved Proposition 13implementation of property tax limitation without violating tax situs and
tax uniformity.
C. The Ease of Reform
Existing law can be easily reformed so that property taxation adheres to long-standing constitutional principles. The principle of tax si602. In the five-taxpayer illustration, the city contracting ratio equals .40 and the effective
tax rate of the fire district equals .2716%. Therefore the credit equals .4 times .002716 times
$25,000 = $27.16.
603. Since the city contracting ratio equals .40, one minus the contracting ratio equals .60.
Using the definition in the text for the debit, .60 times .002716 times $25,000 = $40.74.
604. See infra Appendix, Table 11.
605. Id.
606. For a mathematical proof that the thorough remedy satisfies tax situs with any arbitrarily large number of taxpayers and any complex structure of overlapping jurisdictions, see
Constitutional Reform, supra note 118, at 101-03.
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tus, for example, has become so ingrained in California jurisprudence
that the California Supreme Court refers to the principle without lengthy
analysis or citation. 07 Tax situs should not be abandoned simply because the legislature did not adhere to constitutional principles in implementing Proposition 13.
The problems with existing law cannot be dismissed as unimportant
or merely technical. As demonstrated by the case studies of property tax
allocation in San Bernardino and Los Angeles Counties, many taxpayers
pay more in property taxes than received by their local governments. 08
The revenue transfer will grow, not diminish. A multi-billion dollar,
constitutional problem awaits resolution.
The problems with existing law are not confined to the taxpayers in
cities included in the case studies. Consider the effect on city finances by
solving the violations of tax situs and tax uniformity with the simple remedy. In FY 1984-85, about $200 million, or 17.8% of the $1.1 billion of
city property tax revenues allocated statewide, would have been reallocated.60 9 Two hundred and fifty-two cities, with almost eight million residents, would have received greater property tax revenues, and 174 cities,
with almost eleven million residents, would have received less.61 0 Fortysix percent of the property tax revenues received by cities in Ventura
County, for example, would be reallocated by the implementation of the
simple remedy; over 30% in Contra Costa County; about 25% in Los
Angeles County and Riverside County. 1 ' With the exception of the
least populated counties in California, almost all other counties would
find at least 10% of the property tax revenues allocated among cities
would have been reallocated.6 1 2
The proposed remedies can restore tax situs and tax uniformity to
California's system of property taxation. They are administratively feasible. They use the same information as the current apportionment of
607. In Hansen v. City of San Buenaventura, the California Supreme Court held that the
city could impose a 70% surcharge for water service to non-residents. 42 Cal. 3d 1172, 1190,
729 P.2d 186, 197, 233 Cal. Rptr. 22, 33 (1986). The court noted that the city had supported
its water department, in part, with revenues from the city's general fund. Id. at 1177, 729 P.2d
at 188, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 23. Therefore, it concluded that city residents had contributed tax
monies to the water department while non-residents had not. Id. at 1184, 729 P.2d at 193, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 29. The disputed surcharge was a method for making residents and non-residents
equally responsible for financing the water department. Id. at 1185, 729 P.2d at 193-94, 233
Cal. Rptr. at 29. Tax situs, of course, bars the city from taxing non-residents.
608. See supra notes 502-38 and accompanying text.
609. See Apportionment of Property Tax Revenues, supra note 482, at 35 and Table 15.
610. Id.
611. Id.
612. Id.
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property tax revenues. They are less cumbersome than the formula defined by existing law because the straightforward computations of the
simple or thorough remedies replace the complex, six-step computation
used to allocate the annual tax increment. It is time that the legislative
implementation of Proposition 13 follow the constitutional principles
that have shaped local property taxation in California since the 19th
century.
D.

The Inadequacy of Recent Legislation

Despite the ease of reform, the Legislature has not corrected the
constitutional problems with existing law. During the past two sessions,
the legislature passed SB 709613 and AB 1197614 to increase the property
tax allocations of the no-tax and low-tax cities whose taxpayers are fiscally disadvantaged by existing law. 615 These cities receive greater property tax allocations, provided county government participates in the Trial
Court Funding Act of 1985.616 SB 709 would have given eligible cities a
ten cent tax rate per $100 of taxable assessed valuation, phased-in over
ten years.6 17 AB 1197 substituted a seven cent tax rate for eligible cities,
phased in over seven years.6 18
Neither bill solved the constitutional problems with existing law.
Eligible cities were not guaranteed their additional property tax allocations; county government must participate in the Trial Court Funding
Act but can later opt out. 619 The legislation ignored the plight of taxpayers in low-tax cities that receive more than the threshold rates defined in
the law but nevertheless are victimized by the violations of tax situs and
tax uniformity. Moreover, the legislation did not focus its attention on
the relevant parties. Instead, it increased the tax allocations of fiscally
disadvantaged cities by reducing the property tax allocation of county
613. Act approved Sept. 27, 1987, ch. 1211, § 47.7 1987 Cal. Stat. 4 (repealed by Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, § 5, 1988 Cal. Stat. 5).
614. Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, §§ 4-19, 1988 Cal. Stat. (codified at CAL. REV.
& TAX. CODE §§ 97-.9 (West Supp. 1990)).

615. See Act approved Sept. 27, 1987, ch. 1211; Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944 for
statements of legislative intent.
616. Trial Court Funding Act of 1985, ch. 1607, 1985 Cal. Stat. 5992 (codified at CAL.
GOV'T CODE § 77000 (West 1987)).
617. See Act approved Sept. 27, 1987, ch. 1211, § 47.7, 1987 Cal. Stat. 18-21 (repealed by
Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, § 5, 1988 Cal. Stat. 5).
618. See Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, § 6, 1988 Cal. Stat. 5-8 (codified at CAL.
REV. & TAX. CODE § 97.35 (West Supp. 1990)).
619. See Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, § 97.35(k), 1988 Cal. Stat. 8 (codified at
CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 97.35(k) (West Supp. 1990)); Act approved Sept. 27, 1987, ch.
1211, § 47.7(g), 1987 Cal. Stat. 21 (repealed by Act approved Sept. 16, 1988, ch. 944, § 5, 1988
Cal. Stat. 5).
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government, rather than the cities with the abnormally high effective tax
allocation rates. 620
The fundamental problem with the recent legislation is simple. By
failing to allocate property tax revenues among cities on the basis of taxable assessed valuation, the apportionment of property tax revenues continues to violate tax situs and tax uniformity. Implementing the
proposed remedies can solve these problems, but ad hoc changes in the
apportionment formula, not guided by longstanding constitutional principles, solve nothing.
CONCLUSION

Proposition 13 illustrates the strengths and weaknesses of the initiative process. Proposition 13 allowed voters to address a fiscal problem
that the Legislature had not squarely addressed: effective property tax
relief without increased state taxes or local non-property taxes. However, poor draftsmanship resulted not only in extensive litigation to interpret its meaning but also in implementing legislation which, as shown
above, is unconstitutional.
Without changing the intent of Proposition 13, the drafters could
have explained how the proposed property tax limit would be integrated
into the constitutional framework of local fiscal affairs. This could have
been achieved by substituting a specific implementation plan in section
l(a) in place of the language "[tlhe one percent (1%) tax to be collected
by the counties and apportioned according to law."6 2 ' Alternatively, a
position paper could have been released outlining the different ways in
6 22
which the tax limit could be implemented.
Proposition 13 cast the Legislature adrift in a political storm without guidance on how it could maneuver through the troubled fiscal waters brought about by the property tax revolt. Ultimately, the
Legislature must take responsibility for its actions. It is time existing law
620. As illustrated by the examination of the simple and thorough remedies, supra notes
587-606 and accompanying text, county government can receive the same property tax allocation as provided by existing law. The key to correcting the problems with existing law involves
allocating property tax revenues among local governments of the same type.
621. CALIFORNIA VOTER PAMPHLET, supra note 99, at 56.

622. This latter approach, for example, was taken just one year later in 1979 by the drafters
of Proposition 4, the "Gann" limits on spending by state and local governments. See also
Spirit of 13 (unpublished paper, Center for the Study of Law Structures, now the Lowe Institute of Political Economy, Claremont McKenna College). This document provides an extensive interpretation of the provision of the limits and addresses questions about their
implementation. Unfortunately, this document was not released until after the voters had approved Proposition 4. It has served as a reference document for practitioners.
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conformed with long-standing constitutional principles governing local
fiscal affairs in California.
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APPENDIX

TABLE 1
THE PROBLEM WITH THE APPORTIONMENT OF PROPERTY TAX
REVENUES IN
Pre-Proposition 13:
Local
Government

FY 1978-79

Jones

Smith

Amount
Amount
Tax Rate Amount Received by Tax Rate Amount Received by
(percent)
Paid
Entity
(percent)
Paid
Entity

County
City
Schools
Districts

4.00
2.56
2.24
0.20

1,000
640
560
50

1,000
640
560
50

4.00
0.64
1.76
0.60

1,000
160
440
150

1,000
160
440
150

Total

9.00

2,250

2,250

7.00

1,750

1,750

Post-Proposition 13:
Local
Government

Jones

Smith

Amount
Amount
Tax Rate Amount Received by Tax Rate Amount Received by
(percent)
Paid
Entity
(percent)
Paid
Entity

County
City
Schools
Districts

n.l.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

n.l.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

Total

4.00

1,000

500
320
280
25

n.l.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

n.l.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

500
80
220
75

1,125

4.00

1,000

875

Notes
1. Jones and Smith have properties with identical market values of $100,000 and assessed
valuations of $25,000.
2. n.l. means not listed on taxpayer bills after Proposition 13.
3. Attribution factors defined by Government Code:
Local Agency Share = .75
Local Agency Factors:
School Entity Factors:
County = .667
Jones' Schools = .56
Jones' City = .213
Smith's Schools = .44
Smith's City = .053
Jones' Districts = .017
Smith's Districts = .050
4. Distribution of Countywide Property Tax Revenues Among Local Governments (%):
Period
County
Cities
Schools
Districts
Total
Jones Smith
Jones Smith
Jones Smith
Pre-Proposition13
50.00
16.00
4.00
14.00 11.00
1.25
3.75
100.00
FY 1978-79
50.00
16.00
4.00
14.00 11.00
1.25
3.75
100.00
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TABLE 2
TAXPAYER'S GAIN FROM VIOLATION OF TAX SITUS IN
(PERCENT OF PROPERTY TAX PAYMENTS)

Relative
Tax Rate
1.20
1.10
1.00
0.90
0.80

911

FY 1978-79

Relative Growth Factor
0.80

0.90

1.00

1.10

1.20

50.00
37.50
25.00
12.50
0.00

33.33
22.22
11.11
0.00
-11.11

20.00
10.00
0.00
-10.00
-20.00

9.09
0.00
-9.09
-18.18
-27.27

0.00
-8.33
-16.67
-25.00
-33.33

Notes
1. Relative tax rate equals the ratio of taxpayer's pre-Proposition 13 property tax rate to
(assessed value weighted) average of property tax rates paid countywide.
2. Relative Growth Factorequals ratio of one plus growth rate of taxable assessed
valuation of taxpayer's property to one plus growth rate of countywide assessed
valuation.
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TABLE 4
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM VIOLATIONS OF TAx SITUS AND
TAX UNIFORMITY
SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY (FY 1987-88)
1% Assessed
Value'

Attributed
Revenues

Differenceb

Rancho
Cucamonga

26,754,251
26,754,251

23,793,890
24,073,071

-2,960,360
-2,681,180

Redlands

14,946,094
14,946,094

15,447,832
15,648,648

City

b

C

Percent of
Own Revenuesc
-16.02
-14.51

501,738
702,553

2.20
3.07

Entries in boldface are computations including adjustment for Special District
Augmentation Fund. Entries in regular typeface are computations without adjustment for
Special District Augmentation Fund.
Difference equals attributed revenues less 1% assessed valuation. A positive number means
that local agencies and schools receive more revenues than property taxes paid by residents.
A negative number means that taxing agencies and schools serving residents receive less
revenues than property taxes paid by residents.
Own revenues equals total revenues less operating revenues from city-owned enterprises, less
state subventions and revenue transfers other than reimbursement for homeowners
exemption, less federal transfers. Source: Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of
California, Annual Report for FY 1986-87, Table 5.
TABLE 5
GROWTH IN REVENUE TRANSFERS UNDER EXISTING LAW
IN SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY

Fiscal Year
Ending

Rancho
Cucamonga

Redlands

1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998

-2,960,360
-3,239,150
-3,544,194
-3,877,966
-4,243,171
-4,642,769
-5,079,998
-5,558,403
-6,081,862
-6,654,617
-7,281,311

501,737
548,988
600,688
657,258
719,155
786,881
860,985
942,067
1,030,786
1,127,859
1,234,075

-50,203,445
-53,163,805

8,508,746
9,010,483

Cumulative:
1989-1998
Total
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TABLE 6
GAINS AND LOSSES FROM VIOLATIONS OF TAX SITUS
AND TAX UNIFORMITY

L.A. COUNTY (FY 1986-87)
Attributed
Percent of
1% Assessed
Value
Revenues
Differenceb
Own Revenues'
City of
$1,138,308,198
1,208,888,864
70,580,666
3.69
L.A.
77,855,906
4.07
1,138,308,198
1,216,164,104
Carson
42,766,535
39,457,679
-3,308,856
-14.62
42,766,535
40,497,718
-2,716,817
-12.00
14,908,963
Compton
14,766,439
-142,524
-0.40
14,908,963
14,531,422
-377,541
-1.06
31,426,094
-10,294,124
El Segundo
41,720,218
-55.42
31,698,763
-10,021,455
41,720,218
-54.99
Temple City
7,466,686
7,309,158
-157,529
-4.76
7,466,686
7,150,071
-316,616
-9.57
Entries in boldface are computations including adjustment for Special District
Augmentation Fund. Entries in regular typeface are computations without adjustment for
Special District Augmentation Fund.
b Difference equals attributed revenues less 1% assessed valuation. A positive number means
that local agencies and schools receive more revenues than property taxes paid by residents.
A negative number means that taxing agencies and schools serving residents receive less
revenues than property taxes paid by residents.
Own revenues equals total revenues less operating revenues from city-owned enterprises, less
state subventions and revenue transfers other than reimbursement for homeowners
exemption, less federal transfers. Source: Financial Transactions Concerning Cities of
California, Annual Report for FY 1986-87, Tables 3, 4, 5 and 7.

City

.

C

TABLE 7
GROWTH IN REVENUE TRANSFERS UNDER EXISTING
IN Los ANGELES COUNTY
Fiscal Year
Ending
Los Angeles
Carson
Compton
El Segundo
1987
70,580,666 -3,308,856
-142,524
-10,294,123
1988
77,227,550 -3,620,465
-155,946
-11,263,565
1989
84,500,399 -3,961,420
-170,632
-12,324,303
1990
92,458,163 -4,334,484
-186,701
-13,484,936
1991
101,165,345 -4,742,681
-204,283
-14,754,870
1992
110,692,519 -5,189,319
-223,522
-16,144,400
1993
12;,116,907 -5,678,020
-244,572
-17,664,787
1994
132,523,005 -6,212,743
-267,604
- 19,328,356
1995
145,003,265 -6,797,824
-292,806
-21,148,590
1996
158,658,843 -7,438,004
-320,381
-23,140,243
1997
173,600,426 -8,138,473
-350,552
-25,319,459
189,949,122 -8,904,908
-383,565
-27,703,901
1998
Cumulative:
1989-98
1,309,667,999 -61,397,879
-2,644,622 -191,013,848
Total
1,457,476,215 -68,327,200 -2,943,093 -212,571,538

LAW

Temple City
-157,528
-172,363
-188,596
-206,357
-225,790
-247,054
-270,320
-295,777
-323,632
-354,110
-387,458
-423,946
-2,923,043

-3,252,936
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TABLE 8
THE SIMPLE REMEDY FOR THE JONES-SMITH ILLUSTRATION,

FY 1978-79
Pre-Proposition 13:
Local
Government

Jones

Smith

Amount
Amount
Tax Rate Amount Received by Tax Rate Amount Received by
(percent)
Paid
Entity
(percent)
Paid
Entity

County
City
Schools
Districts

4.00
2.56
2.24
0.20

1,000
640
560
50

1,000
640
560
50

4.00
0.64
1.76
0.60

1,000
160
440
150

1,000
160
440
150

Total

9.00

2,250

2,250

7.00

1,750

1,750

Post-Proposition 13:
Local
Government

Jones

Smith

Amount
Amount
Tax Rate Amount Received by Tax Rate Amount Received by
(percent)
Paid
Entity
(percent)
Paid
Entity

County
City
Schools
Districts

2.00
0.80
1.00
0.20

n.l.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

Total

4.00

1,000

500
200
250
25

2.00
0.80
1.00
0.20

n.1.
n.l.
n.l.
n.l.

1,000

4.00

1,000

500
200
250
50
1,000

Notes
1. Jones and Smith have properties with identical market values of $100,000 and assessed
valuations of $25,000.
2. n.l. means not listed on taxpayer bills after Proposition 13. Tax rates for local
governments are effective tax allocation rates implied by the allocation of property tax
revenues by simple remedy.
3. Entity Allocation Factors Defined by Simple Remedy:
County = .50
Cities = .20
Schools = .25

Districts =0.5
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TABLE 9
DISTRIBUTION OF THE GAINS AND LOSSES FROM USING SIMPLE
REMEDY TO APPORTION PROPERTY TAX REVENUES
Existing Law
Simple Remedy
Tax Allocation
Revenue Tax Allocation
Revenue
Rate
Allocation
Rate
Allocation Net Gain
Jones
County
City
Schools
Districts

2.00
1.28
1.12
0.10

Total

4.50

500
320
280
25
1,125

2.00
0.80
1.00
0.20
4.00

500
200
250
50
1,000

0
-120
-30
25
-125

Smith
County
City
Schools
Districts

2.00
0.32
0.88
0.30

500
80
220
75

2.00
0.80
1.00
0.20

500
200
250
50

0
120
30
-25

Total

3.50

875

4.00

1,000

125

TABLE 10
REVENUE TRANSFERS UNDER EXISTING LAW WITH COMPLEX
STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT
County
City
Fire District
Schools
Total
Pre-Proposition 13:
Taxpayer Rate Amount Rate Amount Rate Amount Rate Amount Rate Amount
A
B
C
D
E
Total

4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00
4.00

1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
5,000.00
Post-Proposition 13:
Taxpayer
Amount

2.00
1.80
1.20
0.80
0.00

500.00
450.00
300.00
200.00
0.00
1,450.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.80 200.00
0.00
0.00
0.80 200.00
400.00

1,750.00
1,875.00
1,500.00
1,500.00
1,250.00
7,875.00

13.00
13.30
12.00
10.80
9.80

3,250.00
3,325.00
3,000.00
2,700.00
2,450.00
14,725.00

Amount
Amount
Amount
Total Transfer
A
339.56
169.78
594.23
0.00
1,103.57 103.57
B
339.56
152.80
0.00
636.67
1,129.03 129.03
C
339.56
101.87
67.91
509.34
1,018.68
18.68
D
339.56
67.91
0.00
509.34
916.81 -83.19
E
339.56
0.00
67.91
424.45
831.92 -168.08
Total
1,697.79
492.36
135.82
2,674.02
5,000.00
0.00
Notes
1. All five taxpayers own properties with identical market values of $100,000 and assessed
valuations of $25,000.
2. Existing law transfers $251.27, or 25.1 percent of countywide property tax revenues.
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TABLE 11
PROPERTY TAX ALLOCATION UNDER SIMPLE AND
THOROUGH REMEDIES
LOCAL GOVERNMENT

County

City

Fire
District

Schools

Total

Transfer

Simple Remedy
Taxpayer

A

339.56

98.47

0.00

534.81

972.84

-27.16

B

339.56

98.47

0.00

534.81

972.84

-27.16

C
D

339.56
339.56

98.47
98.47

67.91
0.00

534.81
534.81

1,040.75
972.84

40.75
-27.16

339.56

98.47

67.91

534.81

1,040.75

40.75

1,697.80 492.36

135.83

2,674.02

5.000.00

E
Total
Thorough Remedy
A
B
C
D
E
Total

339.56
339.56
339.56
339.56
339.56

125.64
125.64
57.72
125.64
57.72

0.00
0.00
67.91
0.00
67.91

534.81
534.81
534.81
534.81
534.81

1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00
1,000.00

1,697.80

492.36

135.83

2,674.02

5,000.00

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

Note
Under simple remedy, $81.50, or 8.2 percent of countywide property tax revenues are
transferred among taxpayers. These transfers are less than 1/3 the size of the transfers
under existing law.
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